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1. Introduction 
Trade agreements have traditionally dealt with international trade in goods. 
Trade agreements today, however, cover a much wider variety of topics and issues. 
Multilateral agreements under the system of the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
covers the topics of service trade, (trade-related) intellectual properties, (trade-related) 
investment measures, and so on, in contrast to the former General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) covered the topics on merchandise trade only. The situation is the 
same for bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements—or regional trade agreements or 
RTAs following the naming by the WTO. Traditional RTAs (typical free trade 
agreements or FTAs) have been for freer trade in goods between countries, while more 
recent RTAs aim for liberalization of a wider variety of economic activities including 
service trade and investment, which are also called economic partnership agreements or 
EPAs.  
At the same time, an increasing number of recent RTAs deal with 
non-commercial policy issues, especially social issues such as environment and labor. 
Some of those RTAs include “labor clauses,” i.e., provisions urging or encouraging the 
signatory countries to commit to maintaining a certain level of labor standards. Indeed, 
raising labor and/or other social issues in trade negotiations is not a new phenomenon: 
the Havana Charter in 1948 of the failed-to-exist International Trade Organization (ITO) 
had a labor provision that urged its member countries to eliminate “unfair labor 
conditions” from a concern about “social dumping”—meaning to take advantage of 
(“unfairly”) low or poor labor and/or environment standards for trade competitiveness. 
Since then, however, the multilateral trade agreement under the GATT/WTO system has 
refrained from including labor provisions despite repeated proposal from some 
developed countries such as the United States and Europe. On the other hand, the recent 
trend of the inclusion of labor provisions in RTAs, especially among some developed 
countries, should be, at least partially, from response to concerns about potential 
2 
 
negative impacts of globalization among the public in those countries. Such concerns 
may be raised from the protectionist motive of manufactures in those countries that are 
facing keener import competitions with emerging-economy exporters (protectionist 
motives); concerns may also be from the social motives of the public (e.g., movements 
against sweatshop practices involved in the business activities of some multilateral 
enterprises).  
Are labor clauses in RTAs effective to maintain or improve labor standards in 
trading partners? On the one hand, some parties in the international society, including 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) that has recently been expressing a 
significant interest in labor provisions in trade agreements, seem to expect that sanction 
through trade-policy measures is effective to have low-standard countries to improve 
their labor conditions. On the other hand, a number of countries, especially the 
developing, are concerned about the (ab)uses of such labor provisions by 
developed-country trading partners from their protectionist motives. Whether or not 
labor provisions in RTAs are effective for better labor conditions in countries, therefore, 
should be an important question from both academic and policy-practice perspectives.  
The current paper, which is built on my own previous work (Kamata, 2014), is 
a unique study that attempts to provide an empirical answer to this question using a set 
of macro-level data on RTA labor clauses and labor conditions for various countries. 
This paper first reviews the labor-provision classification of 223 RTAs in force 
proposed in the author’s previous study by reexamining the texts of those RTAs and 
re-defines “RTAs with labor clauses” according to the following two criteria: (i) the 
agreement urges or expects the signatory countries to harmonize their domestic labor 
standards with internationally recognized standards, and (ii) the agreement stipulates the 
procedures for consultations and/or dispute settlement on labor-condition issues 
between the signatory countries. Based on this refined classification of RTAs with and 
without labor clauses, the paper estimates the impacts of RTA labor clauses on the 
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domestic working conditions in trading countries. The paper employs two empirical 
specifications: one is to measure the significance of labor-clause-inclusive RTAs for 
each country by the aggregate share of the partners of labor-clause-inclusive RTAs in 
that country’s manufacturing trade, and the other is to focus on the impacts of the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA and the importance of the partner(s) of the RTA as an export 
partner for each country. The estimation is performed using data for 136 countries or 
economies for the period between 1995 and 2011, taking into account possible time 
length for domestic labor conditions to be adjusted complying labor clauses in RTAs. 
The estimation is also extended to consider potential difference in the impacts across 
countries in different income levels.  
The empirical results find no evidence for possible pro-labor-condition effects 
of RTA labor clauses overall: the results show that for any of the four labor-condition 
measures (mean monthly earnings, mean weekly work hours per employee, fatal 
occupational injury rate, and the number of the ILO’s core conventions ratified), almost 
none of the coefficient estimates on the indexes of labor-clause-inclusive RTAs is 
significant. This result should be consistent with the view of a number of economists 
that questions the relevance (or advocate the irrelevance) of linking trade policy with 
issues in the domestic labor standards. One should also note, however, some limitations 
in the current approach for the analysis mainly due to the nature and constraint of the 
data, which are desired to be addressed through an extension of the study. .  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following Section 2 presents 
a brief literature review on the topics of trade and labor standards and of trade 
agreement/policy and labor standards. Section 3 proposes a (refined) classification of 
RTA labor clauses through detailed reviews of the currently effective RTAs. Section 4 
describes the specifications, data, and results of the empirical analysis, and Section 5 
concludes the paper with discussion on limitations in the current approach for the 
analysis.  
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2. Trade and Labor Standards: A Brief Literature Review 
 The issues of the impacts of trade (or more broadly, globalization including 
FDI) on labor conditions or of the effects of labor standards on trade are not new as 
research topics, and there exist a number of studies that have investigated these topics. 
In this section I provide a very brief review of the literature focusing attention on what 
have and have not been confirmed to date. My previous paper (Kamata, 2014) presents 
a more detailed literature review on this theme, and there are also other recent studies 
with a comprehensive survey of the literature such as Brown, Deardorff, & Stern (2011) 
and Samy & Dehejia (2007). I thus leave more extended literature reviews to these 
papers.  
 
2.1. What Are “Labor Standards”? 
 The concept of “labor standards” includes standards for various kinds of labor 
conditions. The most frequently referred to are the ones so called “internationally 
recognized core labor standards” (or often more simply “core labor standards”). The 
International Labour Organization (ILO) declares the following four core labor 
standards: (i) freedom of association and collective bargaining, (ii) elimination of forced 
labor, (iii) elimination of child labor, and (iv) elimination of discrimination in respect of 
employment and occupation. In some cases labor standards that are understood to be 
basic go beyond these four “core labor standards” by including “decent work”—with 
acceptable working conditions on wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health in addition to the four “core” categories. Many pieces of literature primarily 
consider the “core labor standards,” while some extends the scope to other labor 
conditions such as those included in the “decent work.”  
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2.2. Effects of Labor Standards on Trade 
 Countries would have an incentive to taking advantage of low or lowered labor 
standards to gain competitiveness for trade in a globalized economy—this is the view 
shared among producers and officials of some developed countries that are concerned 
about import competition from emerging economies and also behind the public concern 
about ‘races to the bottom.’ Do lower labor standards really improve a country’s trade 
competitiveness? Theoretical literature including Brown, Deardorff, & Stern (1996) and 
Martin & Maskus (2001) suggests that it is not always the case, and that there will be a 
number of cases in which countries can worsen their export performances or economic 
welfare. A number of empirical studies including the OECD (1996), Rodrik (1996), van 
Beers (1998), and Dehejia & Sammy (2004) have found no convincing relationship 
between labor standards and export performances of countries.  
 
2.3. Effects of Trade (or Globalization) on Labor Standards 
 Does increasing world trade, or globalization, deteriorate labor standards in 
countries? Theoretical views for this question should be the same as those described in 
the previous paragraph, understanding the view behind the ‘races to the bottom’ concern 
is that keener competitive pressures lead country to lower standards. Thus, the 
theoretical literature has not agreed with this view. Overall findings in empirical studies 
that have addressed this question, such as Huberman & Lewchuk (2003), Edmonds & 
Pavcnik (2006), and Neumayer & de Soya (2007), agreed that trade openness has no 
significant impacts on labor standards, or rather that the openness to trade may have 
positive impacts on some of the core labor standards.  
 
2.4. Effectiveness of Linking Trade Policy with Labor Issues 
In contrast to the literature on trade and labor standards, the literature is still 
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very slim on the issue of trade policy (including trade agreements) and labor standards. 
There are studies that address the issue of the effectiveness of trade sanctions for the 
improvement of labor standards, especially in the context of developing countries. 
Martin & Maskus (2001) and Srinivasan (1998) emphasize that trade sanctions will not 
be effective measures to lead low-standard countries to improved labor standards since 
trade sanctions are likely to worsen the conditions of workers in those countries. On the 
other hand, Brown et al. (2011) introduces some cases in which trade sanction or its 
threat under the Generalized System Preferences (GSP) that the United States has 
granted to developing countries was successful to improve labor conditions in the 
developing countries. Also note that there are theoretical studies such as Bagwell & 
Staiger (2001), Spagnolo (2001), and Limão (2005) that analyze the effects of linkage 
between trade policy (i.e., tariffs) and social issues in bilateral trade negotiations, while 
these studies focus on the issue of self-enforcingness or sustainability of such 
issue-linkage in international agreements.   
 
3. Labor Clauses in RTAs: A Close Review  
Labor provisions in RTAs vary in terms of contents and stringency as well as 
where in the agreements the provisions exist. Some RTAs just declare, typically in their 
preambles, the signatory countries’ commitment to the internationally recognized labor 
standards with or without mentioning the name of the ILO; others detail for what 
matters and how the signatories shall cooperate, and/or stipulate procedures for 
consultation on labor issues raised between the RTA members. Among those RTAs that 
have detailed provisions on labor matters, some include those labor provisions in the 
main texts of the RTAs, while others prepare separate side agreements or the minutes of 
understanding (MOU) for the labor provisions.  
 Having this wide variety in labor provisions in RTAs, and also given that there 
is no single definition of RTA “labor clauses,” my own previous work (Kamata, 2014) 
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has classified RTAs in force into six groups in terms of the contents and stringency of 
labor provisions in those RTAs.
1
 That classification puts a focus on whether the 
provisions refer to the ILO’s “core standards” or an equivalent set of the “internationally 
recognized labor standards,” and categorized RTAs that have any provision referring to 
such internationally recognized standards (i.e., RTAs in Groups 1 through 3) as “RTAs 
with labor clauses,” and the others (i.e., RTAs in Groups 4 through 6) as “RTAs without 
labor clauses.”   
 For this study, I reexamine my previous classification of RTAs with labor 
clauses from the perspective of the potential effectiveness of those labor clauses for 
domestic labor standards or conditions in the RTA member countries (i.e., the 
between-member coordination of labor standards and the enforcement of the provisions). 
For this purpose, I conduct an in-depth review of the agreement texts of the set of 223 
RTAs that are covered in my previous work (Kamata, 2014). The RTAs on which I have 
put a particular focus for the review this time are the ones that were categorized as 
“RTAs with labor clauses” (i.e., those in Groups 1 through 3) in the preceding work, and 
also those that involve European economies (such as the EU and EFTA) and Canada.
2
 I 
have then redefined and reclassified “RTAs with labor clauses” according to the 
following two criteria: (i) the RTA has provisions that demand, urge, or at least expect 
                                                   
1
 The six groups into which the RTAs have been classified are the following:  
Group 1: The RTA requires the member countries to make their domestic labor laws consistent 
with the ILO’s guidelines; the RTA also discusses how domestic labor laws should be 
promoted and enforced in those member countries. 
Group 2: The RTA members should strive to have their domestic laws consistent with the ILO 
guidelines but do not have to commit to do so ultimately; the RTA text also discusses 
how domestic labor laws should be promoted and enforced in those member 
countries. 
Group 3: The RTA acknowledges the members’ commitment to the internationally recognized 
labor standards but are not ultimately required to follow the ILO’s guidelines. 
Group 4: The RTA acknowledges labor rights or working conditions but does not refer to the 
internationally recognized standards. 
Group 5: The RTA acknowledges social values including human rights but does not 
exclusively mention labor rights or working conditions exclusively. 
Group 6: The RTA does not mention labor or social matters. 
See Table 1 of the paper (Kamata, 2014) for the list of RTAs in each group.  
2
 These economies have been, together with the United States, pro-labor-clause countries in the 
GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations.  
8 
 
the signatory countries to harmonize their domestic labor conditions and regulations 
with the internationally recognized standards such as the ILO’s “core” standards or an 
equivalent set of labor standards, and (ii) the RTA has an extensive set(s) of articles that 
stipulates the items/issues for which the signatory countries shall cooperate and the 
procedures for consultations and/or dispute settlement on issues concerning labor 
conditions, as a part (chapter(s) or title(s)) of the main body of the RTA or a separate 
side agreement or MOU.
3
  
 This paper considers two cases of the classifications of RTAs in terms of labor 
clauses. The first case, which I call the ‘conservative’ classification, defines/classifies 
RTAs that satisfy both of the two above-mentioned criteria as “RTAs with labor clauses” 
and the others as “RTAs without labor clauses” or “labor-clause-non-inclusive RTAs.” 
The second case, which I call the ‘liberal’ classification, defines/classifies RTAs that 
satisfy the second criteria ((ii) above) as “RTAs with labor clauses” and the others as 
“without.” Indeed, of those RTAs that detail an institutional arrangement for cooperation 
and consultations between the RTA members concerning labor matters, there are some 
RTAs that declare or emphasize the exclusive right of each country to define or regulate 
its domestic labor laws or standards. These RTAs satisfy the criteria (ii) but does not (i), 
and thus these are classified as “RTAs with labor clauses” in the liberal case but not in 
the conservative case.  
The entire list of the RTAs with labor clauses according to both of the 
‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ classifications is provided in Table 1. The list covers the 223 
RTAs that entered in force and were notified to the WTO by the end of the first half of 
the year 2013.
4
 For a reference purpose, I create another version of labor-clause 
                                                   
3
 A number of RTAs that cover service trade and/or investment (such as economic partnership 
agreements or EPAs) have provisions concerning protection and treatment of migrating workers. 
I do not consider these provisions for the labor-clause classification here, since these should be 
about the issues of barriers to service trade rather than social provisions.  
4
 According to the WTO’s RTA database, there are 17 RTAs that became effective in and after 
July 2013. This study does not include these recent RTAs in the labor-clause classification since 
these should not play roles in the empirical analysis (the data used for the empirical analysis do 
not cover such recent-year trade statistics).  
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classification list that is comparable to the classification provided in my previous work. 
That version classifies RTAs into Groups 1 through 6 according to the two criteria 
applied in this paper together with the labor-clause consistency with the ILO “core” 
standards and its stringency. The comparable version of the classification is shown in 
Appendix Table A9. Note that this updated classification introduces a new group “2.5” 
for those RTAs that satisfies the above-mentioned criteria (ii) but does not (i).
5
  
 
4. Effects of Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions: Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1. Empirical Model and Data 
4.1.1. Benchmark Empirical Specification 
The empirical specification to estimate the impacts of RTA labor clauses on 
domestic labor conditions in the RTA signatory countries, which is based on my own 
previous work (Kamata, 2014) that has been inspired by Häberli et al. (2012), is the 
following:  
 Lit = α + β1TC
LC
i, t-a + β2TC
NL
i, t-a + Xitγ + ui + Ttδ + εit  (1) 
where Lit is a measure of labor conditions in country i at year t. TC
LC
it is the measures of 
country i’s trade concentration with other countries with which country i has signed a 
RTA(s) with labor clauses at time t. Similarly, TC
NL
it is the measures of country i’s trade 
concentration with the partner(s) of a common RTA(s) without labor clauses signed at 
time t (these trade-concentration variables will be more described below). The vector Xit 
contains a set of variables for economic controls, which are detailed later. ui indicates 
country dummies that represents country-specific time-invariant factors that affect 
country i’s labor conditions but are not observable for researchers; and Tt indicates time 
                                                   
5
 Therefore, in the current paper the RTAs that are included in Groups 1 and 2 are categorized 
as “RTAs with labor clauses” in the conservative case, and those included in Groups 1, 2, and 
2.5 are categorized as “RTAs with labor clauses” in the liberal case.  
10 
 
(year) dummies. Finally, εit represents the idiosyncratic error term.  
4.1.2. Indicators of Trade Concentration with RTA Partners 
TC
LC
it and TC
NL
it in equation (1) above indicate how each country’s trade is 
concentrated with the partners of RTAs with and without labor clauses, respectively. The 
indicators are defined as follows:  
TC
LC
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
LC
ijt × TradeShareij,1995)  for i ≠ j 
TC
NL
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
NL
ijt × TradeShareij,1995)  for i ≠ j 
RTA
LC
ijt is a dummy variable taking the value one if countries i and j are both members 
of a common RTA(s) with labor clauses as of year t, while RTA
NL
ijt is a dummy taking 
the value one if the two countries are the members of a common RTA(s) without labor 
clauses as of year t. Both dummies take the value zero when the two countries has not 
signed any common RTA as of year t. TradeShareij,1995 is the total manufacturing trade 
(imports plus exports, in value) between countries i and j (as of the year 1995) as the 
share in country i’s total manufacturing trade with the rest of the all other countries in 
the world. The indicator TC
LC
 (TC
NL
) takes a value between the theoretical minimum 
zero and the theoretical maximum one, and it takes a greater value as the country has 
signed an RTA(s) with (without) labor clauses with a larger trade partner(s) and/or with 
more trade partners. For computing these TC indicators, the fixed trade share of each 
partner as of the year 1995 is used for the indexes not to be influenced by possible 
post-RTA trade increases (RTAs should promote trade between the signatories) or 
capture the possible effects of growth in trade itself on labor conditions, but to capture 
the significance of the partners of an RTA(s) with (or without) labor clauses as strictly 
as possible.
6
 However, for a reference purpose, the estimation is also performed with 
the TC indicators computed with the trade shares in the current year (i.e., TradeShareijt 
                                                   
6
 The trade shares as of the year 1995 are used since it is the oldest data period in the dataset for 
this study.  
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for each year t).
7
 The trade shares are computed using data on bilateral trade flows 
obtained from the UNCTADstat, an on-line database provided by the UNCTAD.
8
 
As indicated in equation (1) above, for the estimation the TC indicators are 
lagged by a periods (years), considering possible time lag of the impact of RTA labor 
clauses on the actual domestic labor conditions. The estimation is performed with the 
lags of one through four years (i.e., for a = 1, 2, 3, and 4), for each lag period at one 
time.
9
   
4.1.3. Labor Condition Measures 
For the domestic labor condition in each country, Lit, the following four 
measures are employed: (i) the log of the mean monthly real earnings of employees in 
manufacturing industries (earnings); (ii) mean weekly hours actually worked per 
employee in manufacturing (hours); (iii) fatal occupational injury rate (in percent) in 
manufacturing (injury); and (iv) the number of ILO’s core conventions ratified 
(conventions). Data for earnings are sourced from the ILO’s on-line database 
LABORSTA.
10
 The database reports the mean monthly earnings of manufacturing 
workers for various countries in the nominal local currency unit (LCU), and I convert 
those data to the real unit measured in constant 2005 US dollars, using the current 
market exchange rates (annual average) and the US GDP deflator reported in the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators on-line database (WDI).11 Data for hours and 
injury are also obtained from LABORSTA, and the data for each variable are used as 
reported in the database. For another labor-condition measure conventions, I count the 
number of the ILO’s core (or fundamental) conventions that each country had ratified as 
                                                   
7
 When the TC indicators computed with the current-year trade shares, the interpretation of 
equation (1) might be different slightly. That is, equation (1) will estimate how trading with RTA 
partners with/without labor clauses affect the domestic labor conditions of each trading country.  
8
 http://unctadstat.unctad.org/  
9
 It might take longer than 4 years for RTA labor clauses to have actual impacts on the domestic 
labor conditions. However, the sample size would be too small if involving too many lag 
periods since the valid data period is limited only to 17 years from 1995 to 2011.  
10
 http://laborsta.ilo.org/  
11
 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators  
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of the end of each data period (year t). There are eight “core conventions” of the ILO 
that concern eight fundamental labor standards recognized by the ILO.
12
 Therefore, the 
variable conventions takes integer values from the theoretical minimum zero to the 
theoretical maximum eight. The information on what core convention was ratified as 
well as when it was ratified by each country is obtained from NORMLEX,
13
the ILO’s 
information system for conventions.   
4.1.4. Other Economic Controls 
The vector of other control variables Xit in equation (1) includes: the log of real 
GDP per capita, in the linear and squared terms; employment in the industry sector as 
the share (in percent) in the total employment; manufacturing value added as the share  
in GDP; and two Freedom House’s indexes indicating political rights and civil liberties. 
The two terms of the log of GDP per capita are included since it is repeatedly confirmed 
that labor conditions in a country are correlated with the country’s income level. The 
industry employment share and manufacturing share in GDP are included since 
trade-related labor standards or conditions should matters the most for workers in the 
industry or manufacturing sector.
14
 Data for these three economic controls are obtained 
from the WDI, and for the income-level indicator GDP per capita in constant 2005 US 
dollars are employed.  
The indexes of political rights and of civil liberties are included to control for 
the overall human-right conditions in each country. These indexes are sourced from the 
Freedom in the World, an annual survey report by the Freedom House. Each index is 
scaled from 1 through 7, with a smaller number indicating a higher degree of freedom. 
                                                   
12
 The eight Core (or fundamental) Conventions are the following: Forced Labour Convention 
of 1930 (No. 29), Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention 
of 1948 (No. 87), Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949 (No. 98), 
Equal Remuneration Convention of 1951 (No. 100), Abolition of Forced Labour Convention of 
1957 (No. 105), Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention of 1958 (No. 111), 
Minimum Age Convention of 1973 (No. 138), and Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention of 
1999 (No. 182).  
13
 http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:1:0  
14
 Häberli et al. (2012) also include these variables in their economic controls.  
13 
 
The data for the current paper are obtained from an on-line database provided by the 
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA).
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The Freedom House conducts the evaluation and rating for a country typically with an 
interval of a few to several years. Therefore, for each country there exist years for which 
updated indexes are not available (let us call these years “non-surveyed years”).16 To 
have the size of sample that is valid for the empirical analysis being as large as possible, 
I have filled in the data for these Freedom House indexes for non-surveyed years in the 
following manner: basically, the non-surveyed years are filled in with the indexes for 
the previous surveyed year; but the non-surveyed years are not filled in when the survey 
interval is significantly long; this way of index filling-in is also avoided when the 
scores/ratings are very different between the two surveyed years (since we have no clear 
idea on in what year the score change should have been reflected) or when it is 
obviously that a significant political event that may affect human rights was the case in 
that country during a survey-interval period (since we have no clear idea on how to 
evaluate the impacts on that event on the political rights and civil liberties as well as 
their persistence).   
4.1.5. Resulted Dataset for the Empirical Analysis 
 I have tried to gather data for the variables for as many countries as possible 
and for the years 1995 and onward. Data availability differs for different variables, 
however, and the resulted dataset for the empirical analysis covers 136 countries and 16 
years from 1996 through 2011,
17
 for which the data for all the variables on the 
right-hand side of equation (1) and the data for at least one of the four labor-condition 
measures (the left- side variable in the equation) are all available. The sample countries 
covered in the dataset are listed in Table 2. Note, however, that the number of years for 
                                                   
15
 http://www.idea.int/  
16
 This is one major reason why in my previous paper (Kamata, 2014) the observations valid for 
the empirical analysis were very limited.  
17
 Equation (1) involves the lagged variables for trade-concentration (TC) indicators, and thus 
the data for the initial period 1995 are not used for the current-year variables.  
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which data are available differs across countries (i.e., the dataset is not in the form of a 
balanced panel), ranging from 1 to 17 of 17 years. Table 3 presents the summary 
statistics of valid observations for each variable in the resulted dataset.  
 
4.2. Estimation Results of the Benchmark Specification 
 If labor clauses in RTAs contribute to better labor conditions in signatory 
countries and it is more so when a country joins RTAs with more countries and/or larger 
partners, we expect that the estimation of equation (1) indicate a positive coefficient on 
the indicator TC
LC
 for RTAs with labor clauses (i.e.,  > 0) for the earnings and 
conventions regressions and a negative coefficient (  < 0) for the hours and injury 
regressions. Or, if RTAs have some negative influence on labor conditions but labor 
clauses can prevent or alleviate it, the estimation would indicate the coefficient on the 
indicator TC
NL
 for RTAs without labor clauses (i.e., ) to be negative for the earnings 
and conventions regressions while positive for hours and injury regressions, but the 
coefficient  on TC
LC
 to be of the opposite sign or zero.  
The result of the estimation of equation (1) is shown on Table 4. Following the 
very first column indicating the variables in the equation, the first set of four columns 
shows the estimation result with earnings as the dependent variable (labor-condition 
measure) L. Similarly, the second, third, and fourth sets of four columns in the table 
show the estimation results for hours, injury, and conventions, respectively. For this 
benchmark estimation, RTAs are classified based on the ‘conservative’ definition of 
labor-clause-inclusive RTAs that has been described in Section 3. (The estimation has 
also been performed using the ‘liberal’ classification of RTAs with labor clauses, but the 
result is almost identical, as shown in Appendix Table A1.)  
As presented in Table 4, in none of the regressions the coefficient estimate on 
the TC
LC
 indicator is significant, even for the longer-lagged term. Thus, no evidence for 
the positive effects of labor clauses in RTAs on the domestic labor conditions, especially 
15 
 
on labor earnings and hours actually worked for which the effects of RTAs without 
labor clauses (i.e., the coefficients on TC
NL
) are also insignificant.  
The estimation gives a positive and significant coefficient on the TC
NL
 indicator 
for the 2- and 3-year lagged terms. Especially in the 3-year-lag case, the estimation 
gives a positive estimate to the coefficient on TC
NL
 with the 5%-level significance 
together with a negative (but insignificant) coefficient estimate to the TC
LC
 indicator. 
This could suggest a possible deteriorating impact of RTA without labor clauses on 
occupational safety (and labor clauses in RTAs might be alleviating it). However, 
considering issues in data quality for the occupational injury rate reported in the 
LABORSTA database,
18
 we might have to be cautious in interpreting the estimation 
result. Moreover, the estimation gives a negative and significant (at the 5% level) 
coefficient on the TC
NL
 indicator for the conventions regression for the 4-year-lag case 
(and a positive but insignificant coefficient on TC
LC
). However, a negative coefficient 
for the case of the conventions equation is difficult to interpret, since the ratification of 
the conventions is basically irreversible and it should not occur that countries decrease 
the number of the ILO’s Core Conventions that they once ratified due to a new RTA(s) 
without labor clauses.
19
 Therefore, it should be fair to conclude that overall, the 
benchmark estimation presented here provides no evidence for labor-condition 
improving or maintaining effects of labor clauses in RTAs.   
The estimated coefficients on other control variables than the TC indicators are 
insignificant in most of the cases. Interestingly, even the income variables (GDP per 
capita in the linear and square terms) barely show significant coefficient estimates 
except for the case of conventions. Only the square term of GDP/cap is significant (but 
at the 10% level only) for earnings, and only the linear term is significant for hours.
20
 
                                                   
18
 For instance, for some countries the reported injury rates far exceed 100%. 
19
 A fixed-effect regression with country dummies is a “within estimator,” so the estimation 
performed here should be basically capturing the average over-time variation within each 
country in the sample.  
20
 The estimated coefficients on the two income terms for earnings indicate a U-shaped 
relationship between the labor earnings and GDP/cap with the inflection point at around the 
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The coefficient estimates on the two income terms are highly significant for the 
convention regression, and it is consistent with the fact that countries with a higher 
income tend to have more of the ILO’s Core Conventions ratified except for a group of 
most-developed nations that have ratified less of the conventions than lower-income 
countries.  
The estimation is also performed with the TC indicators that are computed 
using the current-year trade shares for each data period without fixing the shares at 
those as of 1995. The result is presented in Appendix Tables A2 (when the 
‘conservative’ classification of RTAs with labor clauses applied) and A3 (when the 
‘liberal’ classification is applied). As shown, the result does not differ from that of the 
benchmark estimation presented in Table 4, but the RTA trade-concentration indictors 
are even less significant: none of the coefficient estimate on either term is significant in 
any case.
21
 
 
4.3. Estimation for Different Income Groups 
The benchmark estimation presented in the previous subsection shows no 
evidence for the labor-condition impacts of labor clauses in RTAs. However, it might be 
because the estimation is mixing up different patterns among different trading-country 
pairs. The effects of RTA labor clauses could differ due to difference in the level of 
income among countries as well as their RTA partners. For instance, it might be the case 
that RTA labor clauses contribute to the improvement of the domestic labor conditions 
in a middle-income country when the country signs the RTA with a high-income partner 
that apply higher labor standards than those in the middle-income country. On the other 
hand, labor clauses might not be very effective for an RTA between high-income 
                                                                                                                                                     
lowest third of the sample. The estimated income-term coefficients for hours indicate that the 
relationship between the hours worked and GDP/cap is negative (i.e., the hours worked 
monotonically decrease as GDP/cap increases) over almost the entire sample range.  
21
 Strictly speaking, the estimated coefficient appears to be significant at the 10% level only for 
the 3-year-lagged TC
LC
 in the conventions regression.  
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countries since both countries have applied adequately high labor standards before 
signing the RTA.  
To consider and examine such possible difference in the impacts of RTA labor 
clauses on labor conditions across countries in different income groups, the benchmark 
empirical specification is extended and estimated for different income groups of 
countries and of their RTA partners. Specifically, equation (1) presented in subsection 
4.1.1. is modified as follows: 
Lit = α + ∑g∈{H,M,L} (β1,g TC
LC,g
i, t-a + β2,g TC
NL,g
i, t-a) + Xitγ + ui + Ttδ + εit (1e) 
where the partner-income-separated TC indicators are defined as follows: 
TC
LC,g
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
LC
ijt × TradeShareij,1995 × I
g
j)  for i ≠ j 
TC
NL,g
it = ∑j
N
(RTA
NL
ijt × TradeShareij,1995 × I
g
j)  for i ≠ j 
Index g = {H, I, L} indicates the income group of each country: H represents 
high-income, M represents middle-income, and L represents low-income country groups, 
respectively. The country income groups are defined following the World Bank based 
each country’s gross national income (GNI) per capita as of the year 1995. That is, the 
country is high-income if its 1995 GNI per capita is $9,386 or above, middle-income if 
between $766 and $9,385, or low-income if $765 or below.
22
 This income classification 
based on GNI per capita as of 1995 is selected to classify each country based on its 
ex-ante income level before the country joins an RTA, and also because 1995 is the 
oldest data period in the dataset used for the current study. The indexes I
g
j indicate the 
income category of the RTA partner(s) for each country i: that is, I
H
j = 1 when the 
country’s RTA partner j is high-income (and = 0 otherwise), IMj = 1 when the RTA 
partner j is middle-income, and I
L
j = 1 when the RTA partner j is low-income. Equation 
(1e) thus includes six trade-concentration (TC) indicators: a pair of TC
LC
 and TC
NL
 
                                                   
22
 The World Bank applied this income-group classification for its lending operation in the 
fiscal year 1997.  
18 
 
indicators for three income groups (high, middle, and low) of the RTA partners of each 
country i. This extended specification is separately estimated for three income groups of 
the sample countries (country i) as well as for each of the 1- through 4-year lagged 
terms of the TC indexes.  
 The results of the estimation of this extended specification are presented in 
Tables 5 through 7. By separating the sample countries by income category, the 
estimation now gives a significant coefficient estimate to either TC
LC
 or TC
NL
 indicator 
in some cases.  
 Table 5 shows the estimation result for the group of high-income countries. 
What is notable is that for the earnings regression, the coefficient estimate on TC
NL
 is 
negative and significant for a short-lag period when the RTA partner(s) is high- or 
middle-income.
23
 This may suggest that a high-income country that has recently signed 
an RTA without labor clauses with other high- or middle-income country(ies) has tended 
to experience a decrease in real labor earnings in the following one or two years. This 
might imply a possible negative impact of RTAs without labor clauses on labor earnings 
in high-income countries, and a positive and/or insignificant estimate for the coefficient 
on TC
LC
 might imply that labor clauses could alleviate such negative labor-condition 
effect of RTAs. Moreover, also in the injury and conventions regressions a significant 
coefficient estimate appears on the TC indicator(s) in some cases, but as mentioned 
earlier, we should be cautious in interpreting these results due to the nature of the data 
on the fatal occupation injury rates and number of core conventions ratified.  
Table 6 shows the estimation result for middle-income countries. What is 
prominent here is that for the hours regression the estimated coefficient on TC
LC
 is 
negative and significant when the RTA partner(s) is other middle-income country(ies), 
                                                   
23
 The earnings regression for high-income countries also results in a significant coefficient 
estimate on the TC indicators for the case of low-income RTA partners. However, since there 
basically are no meaningful cases of RTAs with labor clauses involving low-income countries, 
these estimates should not be meaningful, either. Notice that some of the estimates take an 
extreme value, which should be due to the limited observations in the sample.  
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for both short- and long-lag terms. This, however, may not be due to the labor-condition 
improving (or work-hour-decreasing) effect of RTA labor clauses. Since the coefficient 
on TC
NL
 is also negative (but insignificant), this result should rather suggest that RTA 
trade between middle-income countries may have been saving laborers’ hours actually 
worked regardless of if the RTA(s) has labor clauses or not, perhaps due to some 
pro-productivity effect of RTA trade.  
The estimation is also performed for the group of low-income countries, whose 
result is shown in Table 7. However, due to the severe limitation in the cases of 
labor-clause-inclusive RTAs that involve low-income countries as mentioned earlier 
(see footnote 23),
24
 we can hardly find a meaningful message from the presented result 
for low-income countries.
25
  
 
4.4. Alternative Model for Analyzing the Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses 
4.4.1. Empirical Specification 
The benchmark empirical specification that has been described in the preceding 
subsections is based on the idea that labor clauses in RTAs would be more influential to 
the domestic labor conditions in the RTA signatories as the countries joined more RTAs, 
signed RTAs with more partners, and/or have an RTA(s) with a larger trading partner(s). 
However, it might be the case that what is really influential would be the first RTA with 
labor clauses for each country, and that once the country had one labor-clause-inclusive 
RTA effective, signing an additional RTA(s) with more trading partners would have only 
marginal impacts on labor conditions since the domestic labor standards and regulations 
should have been prepared or adjusted in response to the labor clauses in the first RTA. 
                                                   
24
 See Appendix Table A8 for the list of labor-inclusive-RTAs currently in force and the 
signatory countries of those RTAs. 
25
 The estimation of the extended specification for different country income groups is also 
performed applying the ‘liberal’ labor-clause classification, which does not change the result. 
The estimation is also done with the TC indicators based on the current-year trade shares, but 
the result does not differ. These estimation results are presented in Appendix Tables A4, A5, and 
A6.  
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Thus, this subsection introduces an alternative empirical specification to estimate this 
impact of the first set of RTA labor provisions with which a country has agreed and 
needs to comply.  
The following empirical specification is designed to capture the impacts of the 
first labor-clause-inclusive RTA through (i) accession (or not ever) to any RTA with 
labor clauses, (ii) time lag of the influence of the RTA’s labor provisions, and (iii) the 
significance or importance of the partner(s) of that RTA as the country’s export market:  
Lit = α + ∑s∈{1,2,3,4+}{β1,s Di,t-s + β2,s (Di,t-s∙xsharei)} + Xitγ + ui + Ttδ + εit (2) 
where Di,t-s indicates the timing when country i signed the first labor-clause-inclusive 
RTA for the country, in terms of how many years (s =1, 2, 3, or 4+) prior to the current 
data year t. In other words, Di,t-1 = 1 if country i signed its first RTA with labor clauses 
one year before t (and = 0 otherwise); Di,t-2 = 1 if the country signed two previous years, 
Di,t-3 = 1 if three previous years, and Di,t-4
+
 = 1 if the country’s first RTA with labor 
clauses was signed four or more years earlier. xsharei is the share of that first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA partner(s) in country i’s total manufacturing exports as of 
the initial year of that RTA into force.
26
 The other variables are as defined and 
measured with the data used for the benchmark specification.  
4.4.2. Estimation Result 
The result of the estimation of the alternative specification, or equation (2), is 
presented in Table 8. The ‘conservative’ definition is applied to classify RTAs with labor 
clauses. The result gives insignificant estimates to β1 and β2 for almost all cases except 
for a few. In the hours regression only  is significant at the 10% level with the 
negative sign, which might suggest that the first RTA with labor clauses would 
contribute to work-hour reduction when the partner(s) of the RTA is a large export 
                                                   
26
 The export share of the RTA partner(s) as of the year 1995 is applied when the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA became into force in 1994 or earlier, since trade data are available 
only for 1995 or later years.  
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market for the country, but only with a long lag. In addition, in the injury regression 
, , , and  are significant at the 10% level, which might suggest a 
possible positive work-safety impact of the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA but only 
when the partner is a fairly significant export market; but we should be cautious in 
interpreting the result of the injury regression estimation as pointed out earlier. The 
overall implication of this estimation result should be that no evidence is found for the 
labor-condition-improving effects of the first labor-clause-inclusive RTA, and this is 
consistent with the finding in the analysis of the benchmark model presented in the 
earlier subsections.  
The estimated coefficients on all the other control variables are also 
insignificant except for a very few cases, while the point estimates are virtually the 
same as those resulted from the benchmark estimation. This may due to a smaller 
sample size for this alternative specification than that for the benchmark specification 
(less observations are valid for the estimation of the alternative specification).  
Finally, the estimation is also performed with the classification of RTAs with 
labor clauses by the ‘liberal’ definition. As shown in Appendix Table A7, the result does 
not qualitatively differ, while no coefficient estimates appear to be significant.  
4.4.3. Estimation for Different Income Groups 
As performed for the benchmark specification (described in the previous 
subsection 4.3.), it is worthwhile to extend this alternative specification for estimation to 
consider the possibly different labor-condition impacts of labor clauses in RTAs for 
different income groups of countries as well as of their RTA partners. The following 
extension of equation (2) is considered: 
Lit = α + ∑s∈{1,2,3,4+}{β
g
1,s D
g
i,t-s + β
g
2,s (D
g
i,t-s∙xshare
g
i)} + Xitγ + ui + Ttδ + εit,  
for g = H, M, L (2e) 
In this extended specification, the timing indexes (dummies) of the first RTA with labor 
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clauses are separated to indicate whether that first labor-clause-inclusive RTA involves a 
partner(s) in each income group g = H, M, or L (other than the observed country i itself). 
For instance, the index D
H
i,t-1 = 1 if country i’s first labor-clause-inclusive RTA became 
into force 1 year prior to the current year (observation period t) and the RTA involves 
any high-income country as country i’s partner. xsharegi is the share of the first RTA 
partner(s) of the income group g = H, M, or L in country i’s total manufacturing exports 
as of the year when the first RTA became into force. As for the extended benchmark 
estimation, the World Bank’s country income classification based on the gross national 
income (GNI) per capita as of 1995 is applied. In theory, for each of the four 
labor-condition measures, nine separate estimations should be performed for three 
RTA-partner income groups for each of the three income groups of the sample countries. 
However, as seen in Appendix Table A8, none of the RTAs with labor clauses involves a 
valid sample country of the low-income group. Therefore, the regression is performed 
only for high- and middle-income country groups.  
 The results of the estimation of the extended equation (2e) are presented in 
Tables 9 and 10. In these tables, the coefficient estimates on the other control variables 
than the RTA-related terms are suppressed and the estimation results for different 
country groups are stacked for the compactness of the tables and to save page space.
27
 
Table 9 shows the results of the estimation for high-income countries. None of the 
coefficient estimate is significant, except for  in the earnings regression for the 
middle-income partners (significant at the 10% level) and ,  (significant at the 
10% level), and  (significant at the 5% level) in the conventions regression for the 
middle-income partners.
28
 This result should basically suggest that for high-income 
countries, even the first RTA with labor clauses may not be influential to the domestic 
labor clauses regardless of whether the RTA partner is a high- or middle-income country. 
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 The ‘conservative’ classification of RTAs with labor clauses is applied for the estimation. 
Estimation is also performed based on the ‘liberal’ classification, but the results do not differ.   
28
 As mentioned in the earlier subsection 4.2., a negative coefficient in the conventions 
regression is hard to interpret in terms of the impact on labor conditions.  
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Table 10 shows the estimation results for middle-income countries. In these cases, most 
of the coefficient estimates are insignificant, but significant are  and  in the 
earnings regression for the middle-income partners (at the 5% level),  in the injury 
regression for the middle-income partners (5%),  and  for the high-income 
partners (5%) and  and  for the middle-income partners (10% and 1%, 
respectively) in the conventions regression. Among these, the estimates in the 
conventions regression might suggest that for middle-income countries, the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA with a large(r) export partner would have contributed to 
motivating them to ratify more of the ILO’s Core Conventions, and that effect would 
have been more immediate when the RTA partner is high-income while the effect is 
more lagged when the partner is middle-income. Another noticeable thing in the 
estimation result is that no coefficients are significant in the hours regression, which is 
inconsistent with the result of the benchmark estimation that is presented in Table 6 and 
described in the previous subsection 4.3.. Overall, it should be fair to conclude that the 
separate estimation for different income groups of countries does not uncover the 
significant impact of RTA labor clauses on the domestic labor conditions for any 
particular income group of countries, and thus that the overall no influence of RTA labor 
clauses found through the estimation of equation (2) (in Table 8) should not be due to 
the mixing up of the different effects for different groups of countries.  
 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
As mentioned in the beginning of the paper, extending my previous work 
(Kamata, 2014), this study has proposed a unique empirical analysis on the 
effectiveness of labor clauses in regional trade agreements using 
internationally-comparable macro-level data. The paper has first performed the detailed 
(re-)examination of labor provisions in the 223 RTAs that have been in force as of the 
middle of 2013, and presents RTA labor-clause classifications that focus more attention 
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on the labor-standard coordination between/among the RTA signatories and the 
enforcement of those labor provisions: specifically, from the perspective of whether the 
agreement urges or expects the harmonization, to any degree, of labor standards 
between the signatory countries, and also whether the agreement stipulate the 
procedures for cooperation, consultations, and/or dispute settlement on issues related to 
labor conditions between the signatory countries. Based on this refined classification of 
RTA labor clauses and using an expanded dataset covering 136 countries and 16-year 
periods, this paper has empirically estimated the impacts of RTA labor clauses on the 
domestic working conditions in trading countries employing two empirical 
specifications, one of which is measuring the significance of labor-clause-inclusive 
RTAs for each country by the ‘trade concentration’ with the RTA partners defined as the 
aggregate share of the partners of labor-clause-inclusive RTAs in each country’s total 
manufacturing trade; and another of which is focusing on the impacts of the first 
labor-clause-inclusive RTA and the importance of the partner(s) of that RTA as an 
export market for each country. The estimation has taken into account possible lags in 
the effects of RTA labor clauses due to time length required for a government to adjust 
the domestic labor conditions complying with the labor provisions. The estimation has 
also been extended to consider possible difference in the labor-condition impacts of 
RTA labor clauses for different income groups of countries and their RTA partners.  
The empirical results provide no evidence for the pro-labor-condition effects of 
labor clauses in RTAs: for any of the four labor-condition measures employed (mean 
monthly earnings, mean weekly work hours per employee, fatal occupational injury rate, 
and the number of the ILO’s Core Conventions ratified), almost none of the coefficient 
on the labor-clause-inclusive RTA indexes has been estimated to be significant. 
Although the estimation gives moderately significant coefficient estimates that indicate 
a potential pro-labor-condition effect of RTA labor clauses on particular 
working-condition measures for a few cases with particular income groups of countries, 
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those results are not strong enough to have the impacts of RTA labor clauses be evident. 
Indeed, a number of economists (trade economist in particular) argue the relevance (or 
advocate the irrelevance) of linking trade policy with issues in the domestic labor 
standards based on research. The result of the current analysis should be consistent with 
this view. Moreover, some governments (particularly of developing countries) have 
shown their concerns about possible protectionist motives behind such labor provisions 
in trade agreements as well as the possibility of abuses of the provisions for trade 
protection. The result of the current analysis might be in favor of that view by showing 
non-evident pro-labor impacts of RTA labor clauses.  
There should be limitations in the current approaches for the analysis, however, 
and here I discuss two major limitations. One is due to the measures of working 
conditions. The current analysis employs as the measures of labor conditions mean 
monthly earnings, mean weekly hours actually worked per employee, fatal occupational 
injury rate, and the number of the ILO’s Core Conventions ratified, all of which except 
for the last are the measures of labor-condition “outcome.” However, labor provisions in 
RTAs are concerned with labor standards applied in each signatory country of the 
agreements. Hence, for a strict estimation of the impacts of RTA labor clauses, 
labor-“standard” measures such as statutory minimum wages and maximum weekly 
work hours should be employed, if such data are available for an adequately large 
variety of countries and for fairly long period of time. Although the number of the ILO’s 
Core Conventions is the only “standard” measure in the current set of labor-condition 
measures, its quality as a labor-standard measure is often questioned in literature, since 
ratifying many conventions may not necessarily indicate the actual compliance of the 
corresponding international core labor standards (such as the prohibition of child labor) 
by the ratifying governments. It is also pointed out as a reason for the inaccuracy of the 
number of the conventions as a measure of the domestic labor standards that some of 
the advanced countries that apply highest labor standards in the world have ratified less 
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of the Core Conventions than most other countries. Since the current analysis does not 
use any measure of the internationally-recognized core labor standards (or even their 
outcome) other than the number of the ratified Conventions, it should be desirable to 
extend the current analysis also using some measure(s) of those international core 
standards.  
The other major limitation is the limited sample of RTAs with labor clauses. As 
of the end of the first half of the year 2013, only 22 (31 if the “liberal” classification is 
applied) out of more than 220 effective RTAs were with labor clauses. In addition, most 
of these labor-clause-inclusive RTAs became in effect very recently (in the late 2000s or 
no earlier than 2010), as shown in Appendix Table A8. Hence, considering possible time 
lags expected for the labor clauses to show substantive impacts on labor conditions in 
the RTA signatory countries (i.e., time required by the governments to adjust the 
domestic labor standards or regulations), it could be difficult (too early) to detect the 
impacts of the RTAs with labor clauses in the data available at this moment even if the 
labor provisions in those RTAs actually had pro-labor-condition effects. Moreover, also 
shown in Appendix Table A8, the signatory countries of the currently-effective RTAs 
with labor clauses are dominated by a particular group of countries. Many of them are 
with very high or moderately high income, and if the income level is highly correlated 
with working conditions as often pointed out in literature, these countries might initially 
have fairly high labor standards. It may be thus difficult to detect a possible dynamic 
effect of RTA labor provisions to bring up labor conditions in a low-standard country to 
better ones. One possible way to address these difficulties inherent in the current 
empirical approach is to complement the analysis with a type of case-study approach 
through which closely examining the case(s) of one or two specific RTAs with labor 
clauses that have a fairly long history (i.e., became in force in an early time) and on 
which adequate information is available. An extension or improvement of the current 
study based on the discussion above is expected to prove the impacts (or no impacts) of 
27 
 
RTA labor clauses on the domestic labor conditions in a stricter manner.   
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Table 1. List of Regional Trade Agreements with Labor Clauses 
(RTAs with * are included only according to the liberal classification.) 
 
USA-Australia 
USA-Bahrain  
USA-Chile  
USA-Colombia 
USA-Jordan 
USA- Korea (South) 
USA-Morocco  
USA-Oman 
USA-Panama 
USA-Peru 
USA-Singapore  
North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
USA-CAFTA-Dominican Republic 
(CAFTA-DR) 
Canada-Chile 
Canada-Colombia 
Canada-Costa Rica  
Canada-Jordan 
Canada-Peru 
 
European Economic Area (EEA) 
EU- Korea (South) 
Chile-Turkey 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership 
(TPSEP or P4) 
* EFTA-Hong Kong 
* EFTA-Montenegro 
* EU-CARIFORUM States 
* Carribean Community and Common Market 
(CARICOM, 2002 revised) 
* Chile-China 
* Chile-Colombia  
* New Zealand-China 
* New Zealand-Malaysia  
* Nicaragua-Taiwan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of RTAs with labor clauses: 
 22 according to the conservative classification 
 31 according to the liberal classification 
Notes: 
1. RTAs with labor clauses are defined as RTAs, according to the conservative classification,  
that satisfy both of the following two criteria:  
(i) The RTA has provisions that demand, urge, or at least expect the signatory countries to 
harmonize their domestic labor conditions and regulations with the internationally 
recognized standards such as the ILO’s “core” standards or an equivalent set of labor 
standards,  
(ii) the RTA has an extensive set(s) of articles that stipulates the items/issues for which the 
signatory countries shall cooperate and the procedures for consultations and/or dispute 
settlement on issues concerning labor conditions, as a part (chapter(s) or title(s)) of the 
main body of the RTA or a separate side agreement or MOU.  
RTAs with labor clauses under the liberal classification are those that satisfy the criterion (ii). 
(This classification includes the RTA with * in the list above, which satisfy (ii) but not (i).)  
2. The labor-clause-inclusive RTAs listed above are classified from the population of 223 
RTAs that had entered in force and are notified to the WTO as of July 2013. The 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) are not included in the RTA populations.  
31 
 
Table 2. Countries in the Sample for Empirical Analysis 
High-income Countries 
(26 countries) 
Middle-income Countries 
(69 countries) 
Low-income Countries 
(39 countries) 
Australia  
Austria  
Bahamas  
Belgium  
Canada 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Finland  
France  
Germany  
Iceland  
Ireland  
Italy  
Japan  
Korea (South)  
Kuwait  
Luxemburg  
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Norway  
Portugal  
Singapore  
Spain  
Sweden  
United Kingdom  
United States  
 
Algeria 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Argentina 
Barbados  
Belize  
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil  
Bulgaria  
Chile 
Colombia  
Costa Rica  
Croatia  
Cuba  
Czech Republic  
Dominica 
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
Egypt  
El Salvador  
Estonia  
Gabon  
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Hungary  
Indonesia  
Iran  
Jamaica  
Jordan  
Kazakhstan  
Kiribati  
Latvia  
Lesotho  
Lithuania  
Macedonia 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Malta  
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco  
Namibia  
Panama  
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay  
Peru  
Philippines  
Poland  
Romania  
Russian Federation  
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia  
St. Vincent & the 
Grenadines  
Samoa  
Slovakia  
Slovenia  
South Africa  
Suriname  
Syria  
Thailand 
Trinidad & Tobago  
Tunisia  
Turkey  
Ukraine 
Uruguay  
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu  
Venezuela  
 
Albania  
Armenia 
Azerbaijan  
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Burkina Faso 
Cambodia 
Cameroon  
Congo  
Ethiopia 
Georgia 
Ghana  
Guyana  
Honduras 
India  
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan  
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Mali  
Mongolia 
Mozambique  
Nepal  
Nicaragua 
Nigeria  
Pakistan 
Rwanda  
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
Sri Lanka  
Tajikistan  
Tanzania  
Togo  
Uganda 
Vietnam  
Yemen  
Zambia  
Zimbabwe 
 
(Income group N.A.) 
(2 countries) 
Montenegro 
Serbia 
 
Notes: 
– The numbers of data years are different for different countries, ranging from 1 to 16 of the entire 
16 time points (between years 1996 and 2011, with lagged variables).  
– Income groups are based on the World Bank’s income classification as based on the country’s gross 
national income (GNI) per capita as of 1995, defined as follows: 
High income:  $9,386 or more 
Middle income:  $ 766 to $9,385 
Low income:  $ 765 or less  
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Variables in Labor-condition Regressions; 
for observations valid for the analysis 
 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
log real earnings 761 5.24 2.94 - 4.93 16.37 
work hours 665 57.46 43.61 6.84 259 
fatal injury rate (%) 535 6.50 31.50 0 720 
no. of core conventions 1,324 6.81 1.59 0 8 
ln(GDP/cap) 1,324 8.64 1.40 5.00 11.39 
industry employment (%) 1,324 23.27 7.03 2.5 48.9 
manufacturing v.a. (%) 1,324 16.89 6.22 0 35.63 
political rights index 1,324 2.43 1.72 1 7 
civil liberties index 1,324 2.69 1.49 1 7 
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Table 4. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions  
 (RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; and  
RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ manufacturing trade share as of 1995.) 
 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
.205 
(.660) 
   -7.31 
(9.25) 
   -.0806 
(1.41) 
   .0506 
(.293) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
.709 
(.978) 
   -8.54 
(19.0) 
   -.515 
(4.35) 
   .531 
(.522) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 .218 
(.709) 
   -8.18 
(11.7) 
   .252 
(1.69) 
   .248 
(.317) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.526 
(1.28) 
   -4.67 
(20.5) 
   5.34* 
(3.16) 
   .111 
(.404) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  .196 
(.582) 
   -12.4 
(14.9) 
   -.577 
(1.94) 
   .397 
(.313) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  .359 
(.840) 
   -.551 
(21.9) 
   8.04** 
(3.22) 
   -.342 
(.299) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.633 
(.564) 
   -23.0 
(19.4) 
   -.546 
(2.45) 
   .403 
(.283) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   .492 
(1.01) 
   19.4 
(15.1) 
   5.55 
(4.04) 
   -.549** 
(.279) 
ln(GDP per capita) -14.7 
(9.10) 
-16.1 
(10.8) 
-16.0 
(11.4) 
-18.4 
(12.0) 
114.4** 
(47.4) 
138.7** 
(58.6) 
104.1 
(64.1) 
39.5 
(70.8) 
-8.82 
(10.4) 
-6.78 
(12.2) 
-13.3 
(15.5) 
-17.9 
(12.6) 
6.96** 
(2.74) 
7.77*** 
(2.81) 
8.19*** 
(3.03) 
6.18** 
(3.08) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .906* 
(.470) 
1.00* 
(.555) 
.964* 
(.581) 
1.12* 
(.611) 
-5.50 
(4.33) 
-6.75 
(5.24) 
-4.86 
(5.71) 
-.690 
(5.76) 
.672 
(.673) 
.554 
(.768) 
1.04 
(.948) 
1.19 
(.790) 
-.377** 
(.149) 
-.426*** 
(.153) 
-.435*** 
(.166) 
-.297* 
(.172) 
Industry employment 
(% in total empl.) 
-.0139 
(.0795) 
-.0101 
(.0891) 
-.0143 
(.0938) 
-.0237 
(.0970) 
-1.61 
(1.01) 
-1.98* 
(1.15) 
-2.01* 
(1.19) 
-2.02 
(1.34) 
.0660 
(.108) 
.110 
(.128) 
.0921 
(.137) 
.153 
(.128) 
-.0110 
(.0245) 
-.0123 
(.0237) 
-.0184 
(.0235) 
-.0287 
(.0217) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0753 
(.0496) 
.0586 
(.0459) 
.0645 
(.0477) 
.0715 
(.0481) 
-1.30** 
(.612) 
-1.50** 
(.730) 
-1.32 
(.796) 
-1.46 
(.904) 
-.181 
(.149) 
-.188 
(.180) 
-.219 
(.196) 
-.135 
(.123) 
-.0105 
(.0188) 
-.0100 
(.0186) 
-.0151 
(.0183) 
-.0235 
(.0186) 
Political rights index -.0058 
(.215) 
.0546 
(.247) 
.139 
(.314) 
.187 
(.327) 
2.58 
(2.77) 
3.14 
(3.32) 
5.42 
(4.68) 
7.06 
(5.57) 
.606 
(.381) 
.571 
(.416) 
.407 
(.470) 
.363 
(.471) 
-.0268 
(.0913) 
-.0238 
(.0816) 
.0414 
(.0649) 
.115 
(.0762) 
Civil liberty index -.347 
(.286) 
-.353 
(.303) 
-.332 
(.310) 
-.320 
(.312) 
-6.51 
(4.77) 
-6.99 
(4.79) 
-7.06 
(4.95) 
-7.92 
(4.83) 
-.882 
(.630) 
-.682 
(.683) 
-.969 
(.766) 
-.347 
(.593) 
-.0809 
(.130) 
-.0241 
(.122) 
-.0364 
(.113) 
-.0578 
(.110) 
No. of observations 700 648 597 540 623 585 548 505 500 468 434 398 1229 1158 1084 1007 
Adjusted R2  .809 .806 .811 .808 .810 .809 .807 .810 .983 .984 .984 .651 .829 .839 .847 .860 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
 
34 
 
Table 5. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions,  
for High-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; TC indicators based on the fixed 1995 trade shares) 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
2.38 
(2.60) 
   25.3 
(20.0) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-6.94** 
(3.00) 
   -46.8 
(46.0) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 2.09 
(2.23) 
   51.6 
(42.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -10.1* 
(4.95) 
   -77.9 
(84.0) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -4.99 
(8.94) 
   -7.51 
(15.9) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -5.38 
(4.61) 
   10.0 
(19.9) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.458 
(3.83) 
   -25.7 
(31.6) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -3.28 
(4.54) 
   63.5 
(48.6) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-1.84 
(11.6) 
   -177.5 
(127.1) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-19.1** 
(8.19) 
   37.6 
(136.0) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 4.71 
(9.13) 
   -395.0 
(284.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -53.8 
(41.9) 
   111.7 
(163.4) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  12.6 
(11.7) 
   -239.1 
(155.8) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -48.1 
(44.8) 
   -90.5 
(130.8) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   24.1 
(20.7) 
   -49.0 
(48.1) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -32.7 
(44.4) 
   60.3 
(135.0) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2312*** 
(141.5) 
   -753.3 
(1334) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-25.4 
(15.9) 
   46.1 
(98.8) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -2453*** 
(262.6) 
   -5182 
(5865) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -17.8* 
(9.96) 
   -146.2 
(138.0) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  11.2 
(30.1) 
   -245.0 
(307.9) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -27.6 
(17.6) 
   -2992 
(4361) 
ln(GDP per capita) 6.62 
(41.0) 
39.8 
(35.3) 
21.8 
(41.0) 
13.5 
(38.7) 
-190.9 
(165.7) 
-154.6 
(167.8) 
-111.7 
(153.0) 
-164.2 
(124.0) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.0266 
(2.08) 
-1.61 
(1.74) 
-.722 
(1.99) 
-.319 
(1.86) 
9.29 
(7.92) 
8.60 
(8.39) 
5.62 
(7.62) 
6.90 
(5.64) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.322** 
(.131) 
-.432** 
(.162) 
-.411* 
(.206) 
-.432** 
(.174) 
-.750 
(1.02) 
-1.30 
(1.68) 
-.638 
(1.26) 
-.477 
(.837) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.0542 
(.0605) 
-.124 
(.102) 
-.118 
(.109) 
-.143 
(.110) 
.196 
(.446) 
.418 
(.767) 
-.194 
(.546) 
.0205 
(.366) 
Political rights index -.204 
(.311) 
.201 
(.668) 
-.257 
(.766) 
-.461 
(.869) 
.523 
(3.70) 
7.04 
(7.06) 
2.12 
(1.86) 
-1.18 
(2.73) 
Civil liberty index .159 
(.261) 
.299 
(.363) 
.215 
(.251) 
.358 
(.520) 
-2.97 
(3.79) 
-3.07 
(5.09) 
-4.35 
(3.92) 
-.249 
(2.14) 
No. of observations 174 157 141 122 233 218 203 187 
Adjusted R2  .906 .914 .954 .952 .354 .429 .342 .258 
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Table 5., continued  
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
9.89 
(6.98) 
   1.65 
(.976) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
8.35 
(11.1) 
   1.27 
(2.17) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 14.4 
(8.92) 
   1.88* 
(.944) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 4.90 
(12.2) 
   2.87* 
(1.63) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  18.8* 
(9.77) 
   1.02 
(.815) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  12.7 
(15.9) 
   4.50*** 
(1.27) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   13.2* 
(6.47) 
   .635 
(.794) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   15.2* 
(7.56) 
   3.39* 
(1.67) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-86.3* 
(41.9) 
   -7.21 
(5.22) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
15.1 
(30.0) 
   -17.6 
(14.3) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -120.7 
(66.6) 
   -2.76 
(3.39) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 53.4 
(93.3) 
   -37.1* 
(18.2) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -109.8* 
(53.2) 
   -1.57 
(2.23) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -69.8 
(89.3) 
   -24.1 
(16.4) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -34.1 
(28.3) 
   -.730 
(1.60) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -57.3 
(48.6) 
   -15.9 
(15.5) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
491.9 
(562.0) 
   -234.8*** 
(66.2) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-14.7 
(68.9) 
   1.33 
(9.96) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 30.0 
(480.2) 
   -232.5*** 
(65.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -18.1 
(74.3) 
   -10.7 
(7.28) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -884.0 
(715.2) 
   -172.2** 
(65.3) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -133.0 
(129.3) 
   -8.31 
(6.70) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1015* 
(509.5) 
   -132.0* 
(71.7) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -51.4 
(44.1) 
   -1.69 
(4.91) 
ln(GDP per capita) -100.9 
(123.4) 
-40.1 
(136.6) 
55.1 
(171.4) 
16.4 
(65.2) 
3.67 
(18.6) 
-4.28 
(19.4) 
-9.71 
(18.7) 
-5.06 
(21.8) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 4.97 
(6.02) 
2.17 
(6.54) 
-2.55 
(8.39) 
-.883 
(3.25) 
-.175 
(.902) 
.210 
(.938) 
.476 
(.908) 
.264 
(1.04) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.249 
(.346) 
-.336 
(.403) 
-.554 
(.636) 
-.0750 
(.224) 
.0073 
(.0764) 
.0263 
(.0629) 
.0336 
(.0518) 
.0079 
(.0322) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.484 
(.343) 
-.531 
(.404) 
-.788 
(.741) 
-.194 
(.222) 
.0640 
(.0660) 
.0352 
(.0456) 
.0447 
(.0367) 
.0425 
(.0235) 
Political rights index -2.60 
(1.90) 
-1.25 
(2.44) 
-1.23 
(2.49) 
-1.01 
(1.23) 
.0023 
(.276) 
-.118 
(.336) 
-.0302 
(.312) 
.187 
(.415) 
Civil liberty index -.100 
(1.17) 
.652 
(1.30) 
-.655 
(1.24) 
-.322 
(.991) 
-.541 
(.323) 
-.671** 
(.308) 
-.521* 
(.281) 
-.358 
(.239) 
No. of observations 225 212 198 183 350 329 307 284 
Adjusted R2  .292 .313 .321 .465 .928 .938 .945 .953 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions,  
for Middle-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; TC indicators based on the fixed 1995 trade shares) 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.27* 
(.693) 
   5.14 
(17.8) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.96 
(1.22) 
   25.8 
(25.8) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.75* 
(.960) 
   9.27 
(17.5) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.738 
(1.99) 
   34.6 
(30.1) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .428 
(.758) 
   10.8 
(21.2) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  2.00 
(1.28) 
   37.2 
(29.8) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.426 
(.949) 
   7.56 
(25.8) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   2.48 
(1.84) 
   26.6 
(26.3) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-1.77 
(2.00) 
   -71.6** 
(27.2) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
.757 
(1.31) 
   -80.1 
(157.5) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -2.34 
(2.48) 
   -86.3** 
(33.7) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 2.07 
(2.45) 
   -156.1 
(148.5) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .121 
(1.23) 
   -99.2** 
(42.4) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .537 
(2.26) 
   -68.6 
(75.9) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   1.26 
(2.19) 
   -152.5*** 
(50.3) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .171 
(3.81) 
   6.75 
(41.5) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-77.1* 
(45.7) 
   242.4 
(625.0) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-13.4 
(17.4) 
   -167.4 
(478.0) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -112.1*** 
(29.3) 
   387.4 
(667.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -11.4 
(30.5) 
   132.2 
(339.2) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  7191*** 
(2214) 
   -13732 
(51802) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -19.1 
(28.7) 
   653.8 
(538.2) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -34.0 
(42.2) 
   525.3 
(576.8) 
ln(GDP per capita) 9.69 
(9.33) 
11.2 
(8.55) 
4.60 
(7.69) 
3.37 
(7.71) 
140.0 
(140.7) 
121.4 
(114.4) 
74.0 
(110.3) 
17.1 
(101.4) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.275 
(.532) 
-.342 
(.482) 
.0539 
(.425) 
.187 
(.435) 
-5.61 
(9.07) 
-4.41 
(8.14) 
-1.96 
(8.36) 
2.19 
(7.37) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.0820 
(.0746) 
-.0749 
(.0727) 
-.0454 
(.0686) 
-.101 
(.0860) 
-.489 
(1.10) 
-.463 
(1.28) 
-.611 
(1.70) 
-.844 
(1.75) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0879* 
(.0497) 
.0564* 
(.0320) 
.0475 
(.0336) 
.0505 
(.0356) 
-.790 
(.883) 
-.885 
(.969) 
-.587 
(1.09) 
-1.30 
(1.26) 
Political rights index -.168 
(.196) 
-.203 
(.210) 
-.0376 
(.238) 
-.0070 
(.249) 
4.03 
(3.23) 
5.37 
(4.06) 
7.18 
(5.61) 
8.24 
(6.97) 
Civil liberty index -.444 
(.277) 
-.300 
(.293) 
-.379 
(.272) 
-.305 
(.288) 
-11.7 
(8.44) 
-12.8 
(8.61) 
-11.1 
(7.92) 
-12.1 
(7.77) 
No. of observations 429 399 370 339 344 324 304 282 
Adjusted R2  .805 .812 .800 .794 .817 .815 .812 .820 
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Table 6., continued  
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-3.12* 
(1.78) 
   -.0395 
(.390) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-8.90*** 
(2.33) 
   -.440 
(.391) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -2.12 
(2.21) 
   .312 
(.459) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.436 
(3.23) 
   -.452 
(.419) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -3.85 
(3.22) 
   .476 
(.496) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.32 
(4.00) 
   -.711** 
(.293) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -3.63 
(4.60) 
   .489 
(.491) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.379 
(3.40) 
   -.691** 
(.277) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-3.78 
(3.20) 
   -.251 
(1.30) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
21.1 
(28.3) 
   1.96*** 
(.579) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -4.50 
(5.54) 
   .0284 
(1.84) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 11.7 
(50.9) 
   .834 
(1.10) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -3.32 
(5.22) 
   .0321 
(1.91) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  35.4 
(59.4) 
   -.357 
(.496) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -4.24 
(7.09) 
   -.219 
(1.84) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   100.3 
(101.6) 
   -.604 
(1.13) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   38.0** 
(17.5) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-17.7 
(48.8) 
   2.33 
(5.51) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   20.8 
(12.8) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -27.3 
(59.3) 
   -5.96 
(4.47) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   20.6*** 
(7.74) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -129.4 
(162.4) 
   -5.57 
(3.52) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   21.2** 
(8.18) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -113.4 
(146.2) 
   -2.64 
(4.56) 
ln(GDP per capita) -53.7*** 
(14.8) 
-53.9*** 
(19.1) 
-52.7*** 
(19.4) 
-48.4** 
(18.8) 
6.99* 
(3.83) 
9.02** 
(3.57) 
8.72** 
(3.75) 
4.80 
(4.18) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 2.89*** 
(.744) 
2.87*** 
(.971) 
2.89*** 
(1.00) 
2.43** 
(1.03) 
-.354* 
(.209) 
-.478** 
(.191) 
-.436** 
(.196) 
-.189 
(.216) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.172 
(.213) 
.268 
(.263) 
.208 
(.237) 
.353 
(.223) 
-.0219 
(.0298) 
-.0175 
(.0302) 
-.0245 
(.0308) 
-.0336 
(.0313) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0146 
(.141) 
.0114 
(.163) 
-.0279 
(.148) 
-.0247 
(.140) 
-.0131 
(.0203) 
-.0163 
(.0190) 
-.0256 
(.0158) 
-.0247 
(.0163) 
Political rights index .306 
(.375) 
.414 
(.331) 
.110 
(.504) 
-.476 
(.755) 
-.0817 
(.0976) 
-.119 
(.0909) 
-.0653 
(.0701) 
.0256 
(.0163) 
Civil liberty index .335 
(.494) 
.179 
(.520) 
.246 
(.583) 
.673 
(.684) 
.0950 
(.164) 
.197 
(.158) 
.182 
(.146) 
.137 
(.146) 
No. of observations 221 208 193 178 691 650 607 565 
Adjusted R2  .712 .685 .695 .688 .796 .808 .813 .817 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
38 
 
Table 7. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions,  
for Low-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; TC indicators based on the fixed 1995 trade shares) 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-17.7** 
(7.79) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.40 
(21.1) 
   -356.3*** 
(36.9) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -18.3*** 
(4.49) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -3.92 
(18.1) 
   251.9 
(746.6) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -17.7*** 
(2.89) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -3.72 
(17.7) 
   3640 
(4087) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -15.6*** 
(2.75) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
8.17 
(12.5) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 9.85 
(10.7) 
   -735.1 
(895.9) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  10.4 
(11.5) 
   -6303 
(6463) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   12.8 
(12.5) 
   23622 
(12400) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-9.62 
(25.4) 
   25.7 
(202.3) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -12.3 
(16.0) 
   -5.96 
(61.0) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .834 
(11.9) 
   117.2 
(128.5) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   10.7 
(12.4) 
   486.3 
(384.2) 
ln(GDP per capita) -4.45 
(25.6) 
-15.7 
(28.0) 
-17.4 
(34.7) 
-20.9 
(36.4) 
-4.91 
(208.9) 
-186.8 
(321.9) 
-140.7 
(379.7) 
1791* 
(855) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.506 
(1.73) 
.227 
(1.85) 
.309 
(2.24) 
.502 
(2.26) 
-.126 
(14.2) 
11.3 
(20.4) 
6.94 
(21.3) 
-119.6** 
(48.7) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.309 
(.177) 
-.304 
(.178) 
-.313 
(.185) 
-.279* 
(.145) 
-.0813 
(.533) 
-.232 
(.830) 
-.425 
(1.40) 
-1.69 
(3.44) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.0864 
(.133) 
-.103 
(.132) 
-.0791 
(.148) 
-.0749 
(.104) 
-.0402 
(.763) 
-.390** 
(.167) 
-.344 
(.405) 
2.28 
(6.19) 
Political rights index -.271 
(.415) 
-.145 
(.470) 
-.0650 
(.445) 
.123 
(.501) 
-.154 
(1.57) 
-.325 
(1.36) 
-4.48 
(6.86) 
-11.9 
(21.0) 
Civil liberty index -.0274 
(.667) 
-.0852 
(.684) 
-.0090 
(.723) 
.210 
(.852) 
3.09 
(5.18) 
5.23 
(6.55) 
11.1 
(14.4) 
-18.3 
(20.3) 
No. of observations 97 92 86 79 46 43 41 36 
Adjusted R2  .904 .898 .899 .898 .993 .992 .992 .942 
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Table 7., continued  
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   -1.85** 
(.991) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   2.97 
(3.15) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   -15.9 
(24.2) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   .842 
(3.94) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -38.1 
(26.7) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -1.88 
(3.75) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   -.724 
(.682) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   -8.85** 
(3.85) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   6.75 
(7.55) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-34.5 
(84.0) 
   2.65 
(3.43) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   195.0 
(323.1) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -21.6 
(62.7) 
   1.59 
(2.75) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   498.5 
(357.9) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  24.0 
(63.9) 
   1.59 
(2.20) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   4.49 
(5.86) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   20.0 
(122.7) 
   2.00 
(1.89) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   -8.48 
(33.5) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
146.0 
(174.0) 
   10.6 
(12.8) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   -814.5 
(1360) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 75.8 
(109.3) 
   2.21 
(8.23) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -2097 
(1498) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  35.8 
(110.0) 
   -1.82 
(7.65) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   84.6* 
(34.7) 
   -.583 
(6.33) 
ln(GDP per capita) -101.4 
(147.5) 
-131.1 
(200.7) 
-223.7 
(291.5) 
-141.4 
(275.1) 
8.59 
(6.58) 
11.0 
(6.60) 
14.9* 
(7.98) 
10.3 
(7.46) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 7.36 
(9.72) 
9.16 
(13.5) 
15.4 
(19.4) 
9.66 
(18.4) 
-.571 
(.444) 
-.714 
(.446) 
-.950* 
(.537) 
-.633 
(.510) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.781 
(.842) 
.435 
(1.47) 
.778 
(1.72) 
.372 
(1.11) 
-.0514 
(.0469) 
-.0395 
(.0571) 
-.0228 
(.0574) 
-.0477 
(.0412) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-1.22 
(.637) 
-1.00 
(.552) 
-.780 
(.696) 
-1.25 
(.747) 
-.0905 
(.0687) 
-.0587 
(.0789) 
-.0454 
(.0739) 
-.0735 
(.0750) 
Political rights index 1.93 
(3.59) 
1.42 
(3.36) 
.465 
(4.37) 
.919 
(4.13) 
.232 
(.241) 
.311 
(.280) 
.397 
(.274) 
.495 
(.315) 
Civil liberty index -.573 
(3.01) 
-1.13 
(4.10) 
-1.47 
(5.35) 
1.75 
(2.89) 
-.340 
(.352) 
-.443 
(.356) 
-.455 
(.392) 
-.532 
(.381) 
No. of observations 54 48 43 37 188 179 170 158 
Adjusted R2  .998 .997 .997 .587 .720 .694 .680 .717 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
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Table 8. Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions 
 (RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification) 
 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real 
Monthly Earnings 
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours 
Actually Worked 
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational 
Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core 
Conventions Ratified 
(conventions) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
-.400 
(.663) 
2.42 
(2.94) 
1.78 
(1.07) 
-.0268 
(.194) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
-.129 
(.984) 
-14.6 
(11.1) 
-2.85
*
 
(1.65) 
.277 
(.396) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
-.231 
(.786) 
3.08 
(3.85) 
2.94
*
 
(1.65) 
.248 
(.387) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
-.330 
(1.36) 
-1.02 
(7.19) 
-3.26
*
 
(1.68) 
-.0039 
(.528) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
-.0545 
(.412) 
.310 
(3.87) 
2.22 
(3.87) 
.236 
(.458) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
-.372 
(.935) 
2.41 
(7.42) 
4.16 
(8.47) 
.124 
(.600) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
-.308 
(.582) 
.0370 
(3.57) 
2.25
*
 
(1.25) 
.149 
(.418) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.297 
(.872) 
-20.8
*
 
(12.3) 
-3.03 
(1.86) 
.0906 
(.542) 
ln(GDP per capita) -12.9 
(9.88) 
95.5 
(58.2) 
-9.15 
(24.4) 
3.26 
(3.47) 
ln(GDP per capita)
2
 .961 
(.583) 
-5.57 
(3.72) 
.448 
(1.41) 
-.109 
(.214) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.137
*
 
(.0802) 
.499 
(.497) 
.0872 
(.195) 
-.0500
***
 
(.0177) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.113
*
 
(.0623) 
-.728 
(.951) 
-.0787 
(.195) 
-.0217 
(.0190) 
Political rights index -.269 
(.187) 
-.0751 
(1.30) 
-.328 
(.683) 
-.140 
(.0908) 
Civil liberty index -.365 
(.338) 
.512 
(1.95) 
-.307 
(.570) 
-.122 
(.133) 
No. of observations 453 445 398 705 
Adjusted R
2
  .810 .888 .985 .881 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included.  
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Table 9. Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions,  
 for High-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification) 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real 
Monthly Earnings 
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours 
Actually Worked 
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational 
Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core 
Conventions Ratified 
(conventions) 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
.285 
(.526) 
11.0 
(10.0) 
2.31 
(2.16) 
.274 
(.206) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-.924 
(1.15) 
-45.0 
(41.7) 
-4.71 
(4.33) 
.172 
(.321) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
-.311 
(1.02) 
4.72 
(4.35) 
4.43 
(4.19) 
.118 
(.206) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-1.35 
(2.45) 
10.4 
(13.1) 
-5.20 
(4.26) 
.479 
(.324) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
.0751 
(.656) 
.612 
(2.84) 
-2.15 
(5.60) 
.128 
(.312) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-2.59 
(2.15) 
9.71 
(13.3) 
22.1 
(26.2) 
.307 
(.386) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
.0672 
(.578) 
.686 
(2.10) 
2.50 
(1.82) 
.167 
(.459) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
-.977 
(1.01) 
-15.2 
(16.1) 
-1.25 
(2.95) 
.106 
(.289) 
No. of observations 176 234 224 340 
Adjusted R2  .888 .412 .305 .955 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
-.254 
(.489) 
-27.4 
(25.8) 
-2.54 
(3.19) 
.291 
(.183) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
4.05* 
(2.31) 
77.7 
(71.7) 
-2.25 
(11.6) 
-.488 
(.714) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
-1.04 
(1.10) 
7.90 
(6.11) 
-1.80 
(2.43) 
.303* 
(.172) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
4.22 
(3.60) 
-10.6 
(12.1) 
8.71 
(8.12) 
-1.12* 
(.575) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
-2.04 
(3.20) 
41.5 
(34.5) 
12.6 
(13.2) 
.205 
(.129) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
143.1 
(457.2) 
-5895 
(5085) 
-46.3 
(37.9) 
-.909** 
(.434) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
-1.19 
(1.20) 
-.675 
(8.22) 
-.969 
(1.58) 
.0574 
(.146) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
172.1 
(228.2) 
-1921 
(2898) 
18.0 
(7.85) 
-.490 
(.615) 
No. of observations 176 234 224 340 
Adjusted R2  .889 .424 .322 .955 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
N.A. 
(—) 
N.A. 
(—) 
N.A. 
(—) 
N.A. 
(—) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
N 0 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2  — — — — 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 10. Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions,  
 for Middle-income Countries 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification) 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real 
Monthly Earnings 
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours 
Actually Worked 
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational 
Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core 
Conventions Ratified 
(conventions) 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
-.766 
(1.21) 
10.5 
(11.1) 
.154 
(3.10) 
-.665** 
(.244) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
.142 
(1.77) 
-21.9 
(22.5) 
-3.41 
(5.36) 
1.77** 
(.823) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
.232 
(.780) 
10.4 
(14.9) 
2.64 
(4.89) 
.386 
(.791) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-.456 
(2.03) 
-21.1 
(27.0) 
-10.3 
(7.93) 
.195 
(1.39) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
.825 
(.578) 
8.69 
(16.7) 
-5.93 
(5.65) 
.521 
(.869) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-.552 
(2.22) 
-14.5 
(31.0) 
3.55 
(8.16) 
.203 
(1.51) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
-.494 
(.899) 
.448 
(22.5) 
-12.5 
(6.23) 
.615 
(.962) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
1.46 
(1.39) 
-29.5 
(46.4) 
8.99 
(11.1) 
-.0900 
(1.68) 
No. of observations 265 204 164 337 
Adjusted R2  .787 .935 .626 .746 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
-.521 
(.695) 
.709 
(5.04) 
2.63 
(1.63) 
.338 
(.464) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-1.94 
(3.27) 
-2.47 
(44.9) 
-23.7** 
(9.53) 
-1.25 
(2.06) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
1.05 
(1.22) 
-3.04 
(7.40) 
.539 
(4.02) 
-.339 
(.540) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-8.73 
(7.23) 
18.7 
(50.5) 
-20.3 
(24.6) 
6.02 
(4.36) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
2.60** 
(1.08) 
.549 
(8.41) 
1.70 
(3.15) 
-.380 
(.571) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
-13.6** 
(6.23) 
14.0 
(64.3) 
-30.3 
(18.8) 
7.70* 
(3.98) 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
-.240 
(1.59) 
-19.5 
(66.6) 
-.587 
(5.54) 
-.765 
(.623) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
-1.28 
(4.01) 
-27.6 
(425.8) 
-39.4 
(28.2) 
10.0*** 
(3.40) 
No. of observations 265 204 164 337 
Adjusted R2  .789 .937 .633 .757 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
N.A. 
(—) 
N.A. 
(—) 
N.A. 
(—) 
N.A. 
(—) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share of 
the RTA partner 
1st LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
N 0 0 0 0 
Adjusted R2  — — — — 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Appendix Table A1.  Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions  
 (RTAs with labor clauses defined by the liberal classification; and  
RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ manufacturing trade share as of 1995.) 
 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
.192 
(.658) 
   -7.28 
(9.24) 
   -.0767 
(1.41) 
   .0568 
(.294) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
.788 
(.943) 
   -8.77 
(19.1) 
   -.593 
(4.23) 
   .513 
(.523) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 .203 
(.707) 
   -8.18 
(11.7) 
   .261 
(1.69) 
   .253 
(.317) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.476 
(1.28) 
   -4.71 
(20.5) 
   5.26* 
(3.10) 
   .0973 
(.405) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  .174 
(.583) 
   -12.3 
(14.9) 
   -.575 
(1.94) 
   .404 
(.313) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  .417 
(.805) 
   -.614 
(21.9) 
   8.06** 
(3.22) 
   -.355 
(.300) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.665 
(.574) 
   -23.0 
(19.4) 
   -.545 
(2.45) 
   .407 
(.282) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   .571 
(.964) 
   19.3 
(15.1) 
   5.57 
(4.06) 
   -.557** 
(.280) 
ln(GDP per capita) -14.7 
(9.10) 
-16.1 
(10.8) 
-16.0 
(11.4) 
-18.5 
(12.0) 
114.5** 
(47.4) 
138.7** 
(58.6) 
104.1 
(64.1) 
39.6 
(70.7) 
-8.82 
(10.4) 
-6.74 
(10.4) 
-13.3 
(15.5) 
-17.9 
(12.6) 
6.97** 
(2.74) 
7.79*** 
(2.81) 
8.23*** 
(3.04) 
6.21** 
(3.09) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .908* 
(.469) 
1.00* 
(.554) 
.968* 
(.581) 
1.13* 
(.611) 
-5.51 
(4.33) 
-6.75 
(5.24) 
-4.87 
(5.71) 
-.694 
(5.76) 
.672 
(.673) 
.672 
(.768) 
1.04 
(.948) 
1.19 
(.790) 
-.378** 
(.150) 
-.427*** 
(.154) 
-.437*** 
(.166) 
-.298* 
(.172) 
Industry employment 
(% in total empl.) 
-.0140 
(.0796) 
-.0101 
(.0892) 
-.0141 
(.0938) 
-.0231 
(.0970) 
-1.61 
(1.01) 
-1.98* 
(1.15) 
-2.01* 
(1.19) 
-2.02 
(1.34) 
.0657 
(.109) 
.0657 
(.109) 
.0922 
(.137) 
.153 
(.128) 
-.0111 
(.0245) 
-.0124 
(.0236) 
-.0184 
(.0235) 
-.0288 
(.0217) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0751 
(.0496) 
.0585 
(.0459) 
.0644 
(.0477) 
.0713 
(.0481) 
-1.30** 
(.612) 
-1.50** 
(.730) 
-1.32 
(.796) 
-1.46 
(.904) 
-.181 
(.149) 
-.181 
(.149) 
-.219 
(.196) 
-.135 
(.123) 
-.0104 
(.0188) 
-.0100 
(.0186) 
-.0151 
(.0183) 
-.0235 
(.0186) 
Political rights index -.0051 
(.215) 
.0566 
(.247) 
.141 
(.314) 
.188 
(.327) 
2.58 
(2.77) 
3.14 
(3.32) 
5.42 
(4.68) 
7.06 
(5.57) 
.606 
(.380) 
.569 
(.415) 
.407 
(.470) 
.363 
(.471) 
-.0276 
(.0911) 
-.0238 
(.0815) 
.0414 
(.0647) 
.115 
(.0761) 
Civil liberty index -.347 
(.286) 
-.355 
(.303) 
-.334 
(.310) 
-.322 
(.312) 
-6.51 
(4.77) 
-6.99 
(4.79) 
-7.06 
(4.95) 
-7.92 
(4.83) 
-.883 
(.630) 
-.679 
(.683) 
-.969 
(.766) 
-.347 
(.593) 
-.0807 
(.130) 
-.0240 
(.122) 
-.0363 
(.113) 
-.0578 
(.110) 
No. of observations 700 648 597 540 623 585 548 505 500 468 434 398 1229 1158 1084 1007 
Adjusted R2  .809 .806 .811 .808 .810 .809 .807 .810 .983 .983 .984 .651 .829 .839 .847 .860 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Appendix Table A2.  Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions  
 (RTAs with labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; and  
RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ manufacturing trade share in the current year.) 
 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
.0180 
(.665) 
   -6.74 
(8.97) 
   -.333 
(1.31) 
   .156 
(.320) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
.150 
(.988) 
   -7.05 
(24.9) 
   -1.42 
(4.33) 
   .613 
(.417) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.0615 
(.641) 
   -7.28 
(11.6) 
   .0043 
(1.72) 
   .373 
(.363) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.874 
(.972) 
   -10.6 
(21.6) 
   2.41 
(3.24) 
   .170 
(.372) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  .0187 
(.582) 
   -10.7 
(14.8) 
   -.554 
(2.11) 
   .507 
(.345) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.608 
(1.00) 
   -12.6 
(20.8) 
   5.42 
(3.27) 
   -.222 
(.317) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.536 
(.539) 
   -22.0 
(19.0) 
   -.559 
(2.58) 
   .499 
(.311) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.616 
(1.47) 
   2.42 
(12.7) 
   -.318 
(3.06) 
   -.314 
(.350) 
ln(GDP per capita) -15.3* 
(8.87) 
-17.3* 
(10.4) 
-16.7 
(11.3) 
-18.5 
(11.7) 
115.2** 
(46.8) 
139.0** 
(57.6) 
107.1* 
(57.6) 
56.6 
(67.5) 
-9.94 
(10.5) 
-6.50 
(12.8) 
-9.71 
(17.4) 
-18.4 
(14.1) 
7.21*** 
(2.71) 
7.99*** 
(2.75) 
8.14*** 
(2.89) 
5.92** 
(2.99) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .948* 
(.456) 
1.08** 
(.533) 
1.00* 
(.571) 
1.12* 
(.594) 
-5.59 
(4.21) 
-6.84 
(5.10) 
-5.15 
(5.38) 
-1.66 
(5.60) 
.744 
(.669) 
.557 
(.798) 
.859 
(1.04) 
1.23 
(.877) 
-.392*** 
(.149) 
-.441*** 
(.152) 
-.436*** 
(.158) 
-.285* 
(.168) 
Industry employment 
(% in total empl.) 
-.0114 
(.0790) 
-.0065 
(.0887) 
-.0114 
(.0938) 
-.0271 
(.0955) 
-1.59 
(1.06) 
-1.91 
(1.18) 
-1.90 
(1.20) 
-2.05 
(1.34) 
.0662 
(.111) 
.0964 
(.137) 
.0803 
(.151) 
.149 
(.144) 
-.0117 
(.0245) 
-.0125 
(.0236) 
-.0176 
(.0232) 
-.0271 
(.0217) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0776 
(.0493) 
.0623 
(.0455) 
.0683 
(.0474) 
.0741 
(.0479) 
-1.28** 
(.626) 
-1.42** 
(.716) 
-1.21 
(.766) 
-1.38 
(.909) 
-.176 
(.148) 
-.178 
(.180) 
-.224 
(.201) 
-.153 
(.125) 
-.0132 
(.0186) 
-.0114 
(.0188) 
-.0159 
(.0186) 
-.0246 
(.0191) 
Political rights index .0002 
(.215) 
.0726 
(.242) 
.134 
(.315) 
.184 
(.324) 
2.64 
(2.64) 
3.19 
(3.31) 
5.31 
(4.72) 
7.11 
(5.64) 
.614 
(.380) 
.583 
(.419) 
.430 
(.465) 
.356 
(.478) 
-.0261 
(.0813) 
-.0269 
(.0813) 
.0352 
(.0667) 
.107 
(.0760) 
Civil liberty index -.366 
(.287) 
-.393 
(.298) 
-.350 
(.316) 
-.315 
(.309) 
-6.49 
(4.65) 
-6.91 
(4.78) 
-6.90 
(4.98) 
-7.97 
(4.87) 
-.929 
(.644) 
-.753 
(.688) 
-.976 
(.745) 
-.512 
(.602) 
-.0700 
(.126) 
-.0149 
(.119) 
-.0272 
(.111) 
-.0486 
(.107) 
No. of observations 704 650 597 540 625 586 548 505 500 468 434 398 1234 1161 1085 1007 
Adjusted R2  .808 .806 .811 .808 .809 .809 .808 .809 .983 .984 .984 .649 .830 .840 .847 .860 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Appendix Table A3.  Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions  
 (RTAs with labor clauses defined by the liberal classification; and  
RTA trade concentrations are based on the RTA partners’ manufacturing trade share in the current year.) 
 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-1 
-.0418 
(.658) 
   -6.71 
(8.95) 
   -.334 
(1.30) 
   .216 
(.313) 
   
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-1 
.391 
(.942) 
   -7.20 
(24.9) 
   -1.51 
(4.38) 
   .495 
(.429) 
   
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.142 
(.640) 
   -7.27 
(11.6) 
   -.0101 
(1.70) 
   .423 
(.356) 
  
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.669 
(.953) 
   -10.7 
(21.6) 
   2.64 
(3.31) 
   .0508 
(.369) 
  
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.0980 
(.588) 
   -10.6 
(14.8) 
   -.562 
(2.10) 
   .593* 
(.338) 
 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.378 
(.914) 
   -12.8 
(20.8) 
   5.66 
(3.39) 
   -.420 
(.306) 
 
RTA Concentration 
with Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.677 
(.569) 
   -21.9 
(19.0) 
   -.580 
(2.57) 
   .586 
(.303) 
RTA Concentration 
w/o Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.331 
(1.37) 
   2.04 
(12.7) 
   -.124 
(3.20) 
   -.517 
(.336) 
ln(GDP per capita) -15.4* 
(8.87) 
-17.5* 
(10.4) 
-16.8 
(11.3) 
-18.5 
(11.7) 
115.3** 
(46.7) 
139.0** 
(57.2) 
107.1* 
(57.7) 
56.5 
(67.5) 
-10.0 
(10.6) 
-6.34 
(12.8) 
-9.33 
(17.4) 
-18.3 
(14.3) 
7.34*** 
(2.70) 
8.12*** 
(2.76) 
8.36*** 
(2.93) 
6.10** 
(3.02) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .953** 
(.455) 
1.09** 
(.532) 
1.02* 
(.571) 
1.13* 
(.595) 
-5.59 
(4.20) 
-6.84 
(5.10) 
-5.16 
(5.38) 
-1.66 
(5.60) 
.751 
(.676) 
.548 
(.798) 
.834 
(1.05) 
1.22 
(.884) 
-.402*** 
(.149) 
-.450*** 
(.153) 
-.450*** 
(.162) 
-.297* 
(.169) 
Industry employment 
(% in total empl.) 
-.0117 
(.0791) 
-.0063 
(.0887) 
-.0112 
(.0938) 
-.0257 
(.0955) 
-1.58 
(1.06) 
-1.91 
(1.18) 
-1.90 
(1.20) 
-2.05 
(1.34) 
.0669 
(.111) 
.0963 
(.136) 
.0790 
(.150) 
.149 
(.144) 
-.0119 
(.0242) 
-.0131 
(.0232) 
-.0186 
(.0231) 
-.0282 
(.0217) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0766 
(.0493) 
.0621 
(.0456) 
.0682 
(.0477) 
.0740 
(.0481) 
-1.28** 
(.625) 
-1.42** 
(.716) 
-1.21 
(.766) 
-1.38 
(.910) 
-.176 
(.148) 
-.178 
(.180) 
-.221 
(.200) 
-.152 
(.125) 
-.0126 
(.0187) 
-.0110 
(.0188) 
-.0163 
(.0185) 
-.0250 
(.0190) 
Political rights index .0022 
(.216) 
.0823 
(.242) 
.145 
(.316) 
.188 
(.326) 
2.64 
(2.64) 
3.19 
(3.31) 
5.31 
(4.72) 
7.11 
(5.64) 
.618 
(.379) 
.579 
(.414) 
.416 
(.458) 
.355 
(.480) 
-.0286 
(.0875) 
-.0295 
(.0808) 
.0325 
(.0663) 
.110 
(.0751) 
Civil liberty index -.363 
(.286) 
-.397 
(.297) 
-.360 
(.315) 
-.325 
(.310) 
-6.49 
(4.65) 
-6.91 
(4.78) 
-6.89 
(4.98) 
-7.96 
(4.87) 
-.929 
(.643) 
-.753 
(.689) 
-.977 
(.746) 
-.507 
(.602) 
-.0708 
(.127) 
-.0120 
(.118) 
-.0212 
(.110) 
-.0429 
(.107) 
No. of observations 704 650 597 540 625 586 548 505 500 468 434 398 1234 1161 1085 1007 
Adjusted R2  .809 .806 .811 .808 .809 .809 .807 .809 .983 .984 .984 .649 .829 .840 .848 .861 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Appendix Table A4. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions 
(Labor clauses defined by the liberal classification; TC indicators based on the fixed 1995 trade shares) 
(1) High-income Countries 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
2.40 
(2.61) 
   25.5 
(20.1) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-6.98** 
(2.98) 
   -47.1 
(46.3) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 2.02 
(2.23) 
   51.6 
(42.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -10.1* 
(4.95) 
   -78.3 
(84.3) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -4.68 
(8.55) 
   -6.07 
(18.0) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -4.66 
(5.35) 
   11.4 
(18.4) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.607 
(3.89) 
   -20.7 
(31.1) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1.68 
(5.84) 
   69.2 
(53.4) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-1.59 
(11.7) 
   -177.9 
(127.5) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-18.9** 
(8.21) 
   37.3 
(135.9) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 5.12 
(9.17) 
   -395.0 
(285.2) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -52.8 
(41.8) 
   115.8 
(165.9) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  11.8 
(11.6) 
   -236.5 
(152.8) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -51.7 
(47.6) 
   -115.9 
(180.1) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   23.3 
(20.1) 
   -40.1 
(44.7) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -38.0 
(41.8) 
   -42.9 
(153.0) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2317*** 
(140.1) 
   -950.8 
(1543) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-26.1 
(15.9) 
   46.0 
(98.6) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -2451*** 
(256.9) 
   -5340 
(6005) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -18.0* 
(10.0) 
   -146.4 
(138.1) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  11625 
(35355) 
   28962 
(61468) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  10.8 
(29.6) 
   -250.1 
(314.6) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   18209 
(23129) 
   107835 
(118578) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -27.6 
(17.5) 
   -4479 
(5975) 
ln(GDP per capita) 7.13 
(41.2) 
40.6 
(35.3) 
20.5 
(41.1) 
12.0 
(38.5) 
-191.0 
(165.5) 
-153.1 
(167.3) 
-119.2 
(157.8) 
-176.1 
(128.4) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.0506 
(2.10) 
-1.65 
(1.74) 
-.648 
(2.00) 
-.239 
(1.85) 
9.29 
(7.91) 
8.52 
(8.36) 
6.00 
(7.86) 
7.69 
(5.87) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.324** 
(.130) 
-.433** 
(.162) 
-.406* 
(.204) 
-.431** 
(.176) 
-.751 
(1.02) 
-1.31 
(1.68) 
-.655 
(1.29) 
-.607 
(.983) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.0560 
(.0613) 
-.126 
(.102) 
-.119 
(.107) 
-.145 
(.114) 
.197 
(.446) 
.418 
(.768) 
-.203 
(.544) 
.0179 
(.354) 
Political rights index -.191 
(.306) 
.208 
(.667) 
-.277 
(.743) 
-.483 
(.884) 
.539 
(3.70) 
7.09 
(7.10) 
1.95 
(1.73) 
-.886 
(2.49) 
Civil liberty index .132 
(.264) 
.265 
(.364) 
.414 
(.621) 
.638 
(.772) 
-2.98 
(3.79) 
-3.13 
(5.09) 
-4.04 
(3.80) 
.408 
(1.91) 
No. of observations 174 157 141 122 233 218 203 187 
Adjusted R2  .906 .914 .954 .952 .354 .429 .338 .255 
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Appendix Table A4., continued 
 
(1) High-income Countries, continued 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
9.87 
(6.98) 
   1.56 
(.939) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
8.44 
(11.2) 
   1.65 
(2.03) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 14.4 
(8.92) 
   1.80* 
(.900) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 4.98 
(12.2) 
   3.14* 
(1.56) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  18.7* 
(9.75) 
   .934 
(.776) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  12.8 
(16.0) 
   4.68*** 
(1.26) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   13.2* 
(6.47) 
   .575 
(.771) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   15.2* 
(7.58) 
   3.46** 
(1.68) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-86.3* 
(41.9) 
   -6.69 
(5.05) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
15.2 
(29.8) 
   -17.6 
(14.3) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -120.6 
(66.6) 
   -2.28 
(3.32) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 53.6 
(92.9) 
   -37.1* 
(17.9) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -109.7* 
(53.1) 
   -1.23 
(2.18) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -69.0 
(89.1) 
   -23.8 
(16.1) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -34.0 
(28.3) 
   -.515 
(1.60) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -56.8 
(48.6) 
   -15.7 
(15.3) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
522.5 
(556.8) 
   -41.3 
(197.4) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-14.7 
(68.7) 
   .154 
(9.58) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 58.7 
(475.9) 
   -81.5 
(65.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -18.1 
(74.4) 
   -11.5 
(7.67) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -825.4 
(712.7) 
   -41.8 
(100.2) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -133.1 
(129.4) 
   -8.73 
(7.15) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -978.8* 
(498.2) 
   -13.2 
(78.2) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -51.4 
(44.2) 
   -1.88 
(5.02) 
ln(GDP per capita) -100.9 
(123.4) 
-40.2 
(136.7) 
54.8 
(171.3) 
16.4 
(65.2) 
3.80 
(18.8) 
-4.23 
(19.5) 
-9.67 
(18.8) 
-4.89 
(21.9) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 4.96 
(6.02) 
2.17 
(6.54) 
-2.53 
(8.38) 
-.879 
(3.26) 
-.178 
(.911) 
.210 
(.942) 
.476 
(.913) 
.258 
(1.05) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.248 
(.345) 
-.335 
(.403) 
-.552 
(.635) 
-.0739 
(.223) 
.0095 
(.0773) 
.0280 
(.0631) 
.0355 
(.0524) 
.0087 
(.0325) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.484 
(.343) 
-.531 
(.404) 
-.789 
(.741) 
-.194 
(.223) 
.0613 
(.0649) 
.0327 
(.0449) 
.0434 
(.0365) 
.0422 
(.0234) 
Political rights index -2.60 
(1.90) 
-1.26 
(2.44) 
-1.23 
(2.49) 
-1.01 
(1.23) 
-.0115 
(.280) 
-.135 
(.341) 
-.0398 
(.316) 
.186 
(.415) 
Civil liberty index -.0955 
(1.17) 
.652 
(1.31) 
-.655 
(1.24) 
-.321 
(.994) 
-.554 
(.327) 
-.679** 
(.310) 
-.523* 
(.281) 
-.358 
(.238) 
No. of observations 225 212 198 183 350 329 307 284 
Adjusted R2  .292 .313 .321 .465 .927 .938 .945 .953 
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Appendix Table A4., continued 
 
(2) Middle-income Countries 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.38** 
(.677) 
   5.22 
(17.8) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
2.46** 
(1.01) 
   26.5 
(25.9) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.87* 
(.943) 
   9.24 
(17.5) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.357 
(2.01) 
   34.7 
(30.1) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.37* 
(.730) 
   10.5 
(21.8) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  2.47* 
(1.24) 
   37.3 
(29.8) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .0901 
(.769) 
   -5.07 
(32.5) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   2.78 
(1.79) 
   27.4 
(26.6) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.14 
(2.11) 
   -70.4** 
(27.7) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.0531 
(1.34) 
   -90.0 
(155.0) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -2.84 
(2.60) 
   -86.2** 
(33.8) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.06 
(2.16) 
   -156.7 
(148.5) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -2.13 
(2.02) 
   -98.2** 
(43.0) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.806 
(1.77) 
   -68.7 
(76.0) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.465 
(.941) 
   -166.8*** 
(36.3) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.974 
(3.89) 
   6.09 
(42.9) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-63.3** 
(24.0) 
   222.1 
(620.4) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
2.13 
(16.4) 
   -159.1 
(477.0) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -89.5*** 
(20.6) 
   387.4 
(667.2) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 4.29 
(23.0) 
   132.8 
(339.2) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -199.7*** 
(22.5) 
   -5868 
(56206) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -.844 
(15.8) 
   662.0 
(541.1) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -197.1*** 
(21.9) 
   1166756. 
(884719) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -14.6 
(28.6) 
   550.9 
(585.2) 
ln(GDP per capita) 9.29 
(9.27) 
10.6 
(8.45) 
6.37 
(8.11) 
2.66 
(8.12) 
141.2 
(140.9) 
121.4 
(114.4) 
70.6 
(110.7) 
22.4 
(101.5) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.251 
(.527) 
-.299 
(.475) 
-.0233 
(.450) 
.231 
(.459) 
-5.69 
(9.07) 
-4.42 
(8.14) 
-1.79 
(8.40) 
1.93 
(7.30) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.0854 
(.0743) 
-.0746 
(.0725) 
-.0773 
(.0737) 
-.0947 
(.0873) 
-.489 
(1.10) 
-.464 
(1.28) 
-.545 
(1.71) 
-1.00 
(1.72) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0822* 
(.0483) 
.0500 
(.0314) 
.0503 
(.0337) 
.0446 
(.0347) 
-.792 
(.885) 
-.886 
(.969) 
-.581 
(1.10) 
-1.44 
(1.27) 
Political rights index -.193 
(.197) 
-.233 
(.210) 
-.164 
(.245) 
-.0870 
(.251) 
4.07 
(3.24) 
5.37 
(4.06) 
7.23 
(5.63) 
8.07 
(6.99) 
Civil liberty index -.448 
(.272) 
-.317 
(.286) 
-.349 
(.273) 
-.307 
(.298) 
-11.8 
(8.47) 
-12.8 
(8.61) 
-11.2 
(7.93) 
-12.2 
(7.86) 
No. of observations 429 399 370 339 344 324 304 282 
Adjusted R2  .807 .815 .807 .803 .817 .815 .812 .821 
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Appendix Table A4., continued 
 
(2) Middle-income Countries, continued 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.78 
(1.77) 
   -.0886 
(.384) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-9.08*** 
(2.36) 
   -.597 
(.382) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -2.02 
(2.26) 
   .267 
(.454) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -.694 
(3.32) 
   -.541 
(.420) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -4.16 
(3.07) 
   .450 
(.493) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.59 
(4.10) 
   -.757** 
(.296) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -3.51 
(4.57) 
   .483 
(.491) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -.384 
(3.43) 
   -.695** 
(.281) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-3.41 
(3.10) 
   .135 
(1.44) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
20.5 
(28.7) 
   2.02*** 
(.690) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -4.17 
(5.62) 
   .326 
(1.90) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 12.4 
(51.5) 
   .866 
(1.14) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -3.01 
(5.30) 
   .305 
(1.97) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  34.2 
(59.8) 
   -.399 
(.520) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -4.29 
(7.04) 
   -.0415 
(1.89) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   103.7 
(102.9) 
   -.772 
(1.24) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
5782. 
(4294) 
   29.2** 
(12.9) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-14.2 
(46.0) 
   -1.79 
(5.75) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 7523. 
(4052) 
   15.8 
(9.14) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -36.7 
(57.8) 
   -8.75 
(4.45) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  12436***. 
(3766) 
   13.7* 
(7.37) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -148.1 
(168.5) 
   -7.16* 
(3.68) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -6852** 
(2913) 
   10.3 
(10.5) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -109.0 
(145.0) 
   -3.19 
(4.55) 
ln(GDP per capita) -46.2** 
(17.6) 
-45.7** 
(12.0) 
-42.7** 
(19.6) 
-51.2** 
(20.3) 
7.67** 
(3.72) 
9.48*** 
(3.54) 
9.13** 
(3.78) 
4.99 
(4.20) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 2.44** 
(.966) 
2.38* 
(1.19) 
2.33** 
(1.04) 
2.61** 
(1.14) 
-.395* 
(.202) 
-.506*** 
(.189) 
-.461** 
(.198) 
-.202 
(.218) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.144 
(.226) 
.209 
(.271) 
.102 
(.227) 
.374 
(.231) 
-.0234 
(.0295) 
-.0192 
(.0300) 
-.0259 
(.0306) 
-.0339 
(.0313) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0332 
(.146) 
.0363 
(.163) 
.0126 
(.143) 
-.0307 
(.143) 
-.0095 
(.0200) 
-.0141 
(.0188) 
-.0246 
(.0158) 
-.0241 
(.0164) 
Political rights index .154 
(.456) 
.287 
(.361) 
.0256 
(.510) 
-.470 
(.750) 
-.083 
(.101) 
-.120 
(.0925) 
-.0648 
(.0696) 
.0252 
(.0867) 
Civil liberty index .224 
(.500) 
.0403 
(.529) 
-.0384 
(.608) 
.787 
(.727) 
.103 
(.164) 
.203 
(.158) 
.187 
(.146) 
.143 
(.146) 
No. of observations 221 208 193 178 691 650 607 565 
Adjusted R2  .711 .686 .701 .688 .797 .808 .813 .816 
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Appendix Table A4., continued 
 
(3) Low-income Countries 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-16.7** 
(6.59) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.37 
(21.1) 
   -356.3*** 
(36.9) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -17.3*** 
(4.10) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -3.92 
(18.1) 
   251.9 
(746.6) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -17.7*** 
(2.89) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -3.72 
(17.7) 
   3640 
(4087) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -15.6*** 
(2.75) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
8.17 
(12.5) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 9.85 
(10.7) 
   -735.1 
(895.9) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  10.4 
(11.5) 
   -6303 
(6463) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   12.8 
(12.5) 
   23622 
(12400) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-9.62 
(25.4) 
   25.7 
(202.3) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -12.3 
(16.0) 
   -5.96 
(61.0) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .834 
(11.9) 
   117.2 
(128.5) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   10.7 
(12.4) 
   486.3 
(384.2) 
ln(GDP per capita) -4.45 
(25.6) 
-15.7 
(28.0) 
-17.4 
(34.7) 
-20.9 
(36.4) 
-4.91 
(208.9) 
-186.8 
(321.9) 
-140.7 
(379.7) 
1791* 
(855) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.506 
(1.73) 
.227 
(1.85) 
.309 
(2.24) 
.502 
(2.26) 
-.126 
(14.2) 
11.3 
(20.4) 
6.94 
(21.3) 
-119.6** 
(48.7) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.309 
(.177) 
-.304 
(.178) 
-.313 
(.185) 
-.279* 
(.145) 
-.0813 
(.533) 
-.232 
(.830) 
-.425 
(1.40) 
-1.69 
(3.44) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.0864 
(.133) 
-.103 
(.132) 
-.0791 
(.148) 
-.0749 
(.104) 
-.0402 
(.763) 
-.390** 
(.167) 
-.344 
(.405) 
2.28 
(6.19) 
Political rights index -.271 
(.415) 
-.145 
(.470) 
-.0650 
(.445) 
.123 
(.501) 
-.154 
(1.57) 
-.325 
(1.36) 
-4.48 
(6.86) 
-11.9 
(21.0) 
Civil liberty index -.0274 
(.667) 
-.0852 
(.684) 
-.0090 
(.723) 
.210 
(.852) 
3.09 
(5.18) 
5.23 
(6.55) 
11.1 
(14.4) 
-18.3 
(20.3) 
No. of observations 97 92 86 79 46 43 41 36 
Adjusted R2  .904 .898 .899 .898 .993 .992 .992 .942 
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Appendix Table A4., continued 
 
(3) Low-income Countries, continued 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   -2.01* 
(1.08) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   2.97 
(3.15) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   -7.86 
(16.9) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   .722 
(3.80) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -16.0 
(18.9) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -2.05 
(3.32) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   -18.9 
(24.8) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   -8.03* 
(4.12) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   8.79 
(7.88) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-34.5 
(84.0) 
   2.64 
(3.43) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   87.2 
(212.8) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -21.6 
(62.7) 
   1.63 
(2.72) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   201.0 
(241.1) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  24.0 
(63.9) 
   1.52 
(2.12) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   247.0 
(325.4) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   20.0 
(122.7) 
   1.57 
(2.04) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   -18.0 
(36.1) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
146.0 
(174.0) 
   10.6 
(12.8) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   -352.3 
(894.3) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 75.8 
(109.3) 
   2.01 
(8.13) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -834.8 
(1024) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  35.8 
(110.0) 
   -2.02 
(7.48) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   -1037 
(1391) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   84.6* 
(34.7) 
   -.743 
(6.31) 
ln(GDP per capita) -101.4 
(147.5) 
-131.1 
(200.7) 
-223.8 
(291.5) 
-141.4 
(275.1) 
8.60 
(6.58) 
10.8 
(6.69) 
14.7* 
(8.09) 
9.14 
(7.74) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 7.36 
(9.72) 
9.16 
(13.5) 
15.4 
(19.4) 
9.66 
(18.4) 
-.571 
(.444) 
-.703 
(.449) 
-.941* 
(.543) 
-.565 
(.522) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.781 
(.842) 
.435 
(1.47) 
.778 
(1.72) 
.372 
(1.11) 
-.0514 
(.0467) 
-.0433 
(.0602) 
-.0307 
(.0611) 
-.0587 
(.0491) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-1.22 
(.637) 
-1.00 
(.552) 
-.780 
(.696) 
-1.25 
(.747) 
-.0906 
(.0688) 
-.0586 
(.0789) 
-.0462 
(.0748) 
-.0759 
(.0783) 
Political rights index 1.93 
(3.59) 
1.42 
(3.36) 
.465 
(4.37) 
.919 
(4.13) 
.231 
(.241) 
.300 
(.282) 
.373 
(.269) 
.468 
(.303) 
Civil liberty index -.573 
(3.01) 
-1.13 
(4.10) 
-1.47 
(5.35) 
1.75 
(2.89) 
-.336 
(.353) 
-.428 
(.363) 
-.420 
(.387) 
-.483 
(.386) 
No. of observations 54 48 43 37 188 179 170 158 
Adjusted R2  .998 .997 .997 .587 .720 .694 .680 .716  
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Appendix Table A5. Impacts of RTA with Labor Clauses vs. RTA without Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions 
(Labor clauses defined by the conservative classification; TC indicators based on the current-year trade shares) 
(1) High-income Countries 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
3.02 
(2.40) 
   1.96 
(10.5) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-3.34 
(4.17) 
   -10.2 
(53.0) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -3.49 
(2.29) 
   53.3 
(49.0) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -3.93 
(4.70) 
   -51.5 
(89.4) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -8.47 
(6.63) 
   10.6 
(28.7) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -4.36 
(2.52) 
   22.5 
(46.6) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -2.97 
(4.46) 
   -7.01 
(23.0) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1.81 
(2.57) 
   16.8 
(71.3) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-3.65 
(6.11) 
   -38.1 
(35.2) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-26.5** 
(10.8) 
   86.3 
(152.2) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 11.5** 
(5.09) 
   -193.3 
(163.1) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -49.6** 
(19.9) 
   -63.0 
(151.2) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  9.00* 
(4.73) 
   -134.6 
(106.5) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -41.5 
(26.1) 
   -53.6 
(121.3) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   4.54 
(5.98) 
   13.8 
(20.4) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -35.8 
(22.5) 
   105.7 
(124.2) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-1395*** 
(132.2) 
   22.8 
(506.3) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-11.8** 
(5.51) 
   33.6 
(29.6) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -1327*** 
(126.0) 
   -4284 
(4587.5) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -4.08 
(3.04) 
   -65.7 
(71.2) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  3.98 
(6.55) 
   -73.5 
(92.7) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -6.59 
(6.42) 
   232.5 
(1016) 
ln(GDP per capita) -13.3 
(47.0) 
55.0 
(37.6) 
30.2 
(41.3) 
2.79 
(35.2) 
-114.7 
(150.7) 
-256.6 
(273.1) 
-128.6 
(189.1) 
-85.9 
(111.6) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 .967 
(2.37) 
-2.37 
(1.84) 
-1.10 
(1.99) 
.290 
(1.71) 
4.87 
(6.87) 
12.4 
(12.8) 
6.06 
(8.95) 
3.00 
(5.60) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.314** 
(.118) 
-.487*** 
(.151) 
-.441** 
(.168) 
-.407** 
(.164) 
-.419 
(.732) 
-.603 
(1.22) 
-.568 
(1.18) 
-.510 
(.860) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.0587 
(.0620) 
-.118 
(.0996) 
-.0626 
(.0858) 
-.125 
(.110) 
-.294 
(.530) 
.121 
(.572) 
-.190 
(.539) 
-.0473 
(.395) 
Political rights index -.114 
(.293) 
.317 
(.505) 
-.0166 
(.645) 
-.285 
(.731) 
-3.07 
(5.49) 
3.51 
(5.46) 
1.52 
(2.51) 
-1.39 
(2.80) 
Civil liberty index .0689 
(.246) 
-.142 
(.351) 
-.408* 
(.202) 
-.0318 
(.400) 
-1.60 
(2.72) 
-4.55 
(5.28) 
-4.07 
(4.25) 
-.532 
(2.02) 
No. of observations 174 157 141 122 233 218 203 187 
Adjusted R2  .907 .919 .959 .954 .344 .414 .337 .255 
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Appendix Table A5., continued 
 
(1) High-income Countries, continued 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
7.86 
(5.03) 
   1.15 
(.853) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
19.7 
(25.9) 
   4.07* 
(.942) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 15.2* 
(7.88) 
   .918 
(.662) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 18.6 
(33.4) 
   7.28*** 
(1.04) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  20.7 
(12.0) 
   .894 
(.672) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  39.9 
(39.7) 
   8.07* 
(1.77) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   12.0** 
(5.45) 
   .736 
(.753) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   25.7** 
(9.76) 
   6.22*** 
(1.15) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-32.7* 
(17.8) 
   -4.05 
(2.82) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.10 
(30.4) 
   7.21** 
(2.77) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -54.7* 
(30.3) 
   -3.55* 
(2.01) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -5.70 
(48.1) 
   4.98* 
(2.47) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -54.7* 
(30.0) 
   -3.02* 
(1.56) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -79.3 
(59.2) 
   1.98 
(2.93) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -17.2 
(13.6) 
   -2.45 
(1.44) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -40.3 
(35.9) 
   .826 
(1.79) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
54.1 
(332.6) 
   -97.5** 
(45.8) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-1.18 
(16.8) 
   .806 
(2.41) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -390.3 
(256.5) 
   -84.2** 
(33.2) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -11.2 
(24.7) 
   -.293 
(1.76) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -933.5 
(564.5) 
   -77.1** 
(32.1) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -39.2 
(40.8) 
   -.410 
(1.39) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -669.6 
(406.5) 
   -75.8** 
(33.3) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -4.12 
(8.57) 
   .732 
(.944) 
ln(GDP per capita) -107.7 
(131.8) 
-97.0 
(156.3) 
-33.2 
(165.3) 
-4.46 
(74.5) 
.759 
(16.1) 
-12.4 
(17.5) 
-11.7 
(14.9) 
-2.97 
(20.0) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 5.27 
(6.41) 
4.81 
(7.48) 
1.75 
(8.00) 
.269 
(3.68) 
-.0012 
(.772) 
.634 
(.827) 
.614 
(.717) 
.192 
(.959) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.208 
(.310) 
-.270 
(.378) 
-.566 
(.657) 
-.0632 
(.242) 
-.0211 
(.0682) 
.0140 
(.0600) 
.0228 
(.0481) 
.0051 
(.0282) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.545 
(.466) 
-.654 
(.580) 
-.833 
(.822) 
-.195 
(.222) 
.0366 
(.0579) 
.0443 
(.0478) 
.0528 
(.0334) 
.0477** 
(.0210) 
Political rights index -2.77 
(2.01) 
-2.28 
(2.92) 
-2.01 
(3.09) 
-.697 
(1.01) 
-.0885 
(.252) 
-.183 
(.334) 
.0772 
(.265) 
.299 
(.398) 
Civil liberty index -.268 
(1.10) 
-.0588 
(1.11) 
-1.29 
(1.40) 
-.518 
(1.07) 
-.353 
(.295) 
-.345 
(.253) 
-.288 
(.188) 
-.194 
(.125) 
No. of observations 225 212 198 183 350 329 307 284 
Adjusted R2  .279 .302 .320 .461 .931 .942 .951 .956 
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Appendix Table A5., continued 
 
(2) Middle-income Countries 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
1.37 
(1.17) 
   14.0 
(24.9) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
3.75** 
(1.57) 
   8.28 
(13.3) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.97 
(1.60) 
   21.2 
(25.8) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 .410 
(1.83) 
   24.6 
(22.7) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -1.47 
(1.38) 
   18.9 
(33.9) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  3.39** 
(1.58) 
   40.8 
(32.9) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -1.12 
(1.23) 
   13.2 
(57.5) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   4.49** 
(1.89) 
   42.9 
(40.6) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-3.88 
(2.49) 
   -93.4 
(100.7) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.908 
(1.44) 
   58.6 
(88.4) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -5.19 
(3.73) 
   -124.5 
(127.8) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.20 
(1.27) 
   -18.7 
(51.9) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .378 
(3.08) 
   -114.5 
(152.7) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -1.45 
(2.16) 
   -43.4 
(42.2) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   2.37 
(3.13) 
   -164.5 
(255.9) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -4.66 
(3.46) 
   -62.0 
(60.7) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-51.5*** 
(12.9) 
   357.7 
(353.2) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-9.16*** 
(2.88) 
   20.1 
(52.7) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -65.0*** 
(9.85) 
   318.1 
(373.7) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -13.7*** 
(3.50) 
   59.3 
(48.5) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1358*** 
(495.0) 
   -2984 
(8435) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -17.0*** 
(5.39) 
   57.7 
(49.9) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -25.8*** 
(5.52) 
   62.0 
(58.7) 
ln(GDP per capita) 7.39 
(8.99) 
10.2 
(8.92) 
2.11 
(7.50) 
-2.79 
(7.95) 
178.2 
(160.4) 
104.2 
(133.5) 
52.5 
(108.1) 
-24.9 
(119.4) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.115 
(.517) 
-.264 
(.496) 
.173 
(.406) 
.479 
(.416) 
-7.73 
(9.84) 
-3.41 
(8.81) 
-1.15 
(7.88) 
3.88 
(7.89) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.0881 
(.0700) 
-.0750 
(.0688) 
-.0443 
(.0655) 
-.0956 
(.0831) 
-.443 
(1.25) 
-.388 
(1.51) 
-.588 
(1.76) 
-1.05 
(1.87) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0862* 
(.0506) 
.0445 
(.0316) 
.0495 
(.0341) 
.0517 
(.0353) 
-1.04 
(.860) 
-.791 
(.966) 
-.409 
(1.13) 
-.882 
(1.20) 
Political rights index -.0669 
(.193) 
-.0509 
(.207) 
.155 
(.219) 
.190 
(.208) 
3.34 
(2.42) 
4.41 
(3.62) 
7.13 
(5.70) 
8.14 
(6.87) 
Civil liberty index -.518* 
(.274) 
-.416 
(.309) 
-.433 
(.268) 
-.306 
(.288) 
-10.1 
(6.82) 
-11.7 
(7.88) 
-11.0 
(8.09) 
-11.0 
(7.25) 
No. of observations 429 399 370 339 344 324 304 282 
Adjusted R2  .812 .818 .813 .817 .816 .812 .809 .816 
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Appendix Table A5., continued 
 
(2) Middle-income Countries, continued 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-2.74 
(2.53) 
   -1.01** 
(.497) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-10.3*** 
(2.51) 
   -.256 
(.413) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -1.81 
(2.71) 
   -.858 
(.542) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -4.74** 
(2.09) 
   -.428 
(.463) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -1.29 
(2.74) 
   -.723 
(.578) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -2.83 
(2.80) 
   -.592* 
(.316) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .272 
(6.68) 
   -.829 
(.573) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -4.95** 
(1.87) 
   -.458 
(.292) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-4.53 
(9.46) 
   4.18* 
(2.24) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
22.4 
(14.4) 
   1.09 
(.926) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -6.58 
(12.6) 
   5.66* 
(2.89) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 21.6 
(19.1) 
   -.690 
(1.10) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -10.9 
(12.9) 
   5.61** 
(2.75) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  11.1 
(10.3) 
   -1.60 
(.970) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -14.5 
(20.0) 
   5.92** 
(2.94) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   8.77 
(9.47) 
   -1.65 
(1.40) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   19.9*** 
(3.73) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
.350 
(8.12) 
   1.58 
(1.22) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   14.8*** 
(3.45) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -1.52 
(6.45) 
   .861 
(1.24) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   12.7*** 
(2.99) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -3.84 
(9.02) 
   -.136 
(1.07) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   13.6*** 
(2.93) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -7.41 
(12.4) 
   .0547 
(.991) 
ln(GDP per capita) -44.8*** 
(11.8) 
-41.8 
(16.7) 
-41.6** 
(16.0) 
-38.0 
(24.2) 
7.82* 
(3.98) 
9.37** 
(3.71) 
7.97** 
(3.72) 
3.22 
(3.74) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 2.58*** 
(.622) 
2.34 
(.818) 
2.32 
(.810) 
1.80 
(1.21) 
-.410* 
(.221) 
-.514** 
(.204) 
-.411** 
(.206) 
-.117 
(.212) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.0910 
(.171) 
.219 
(.250) 
.299 
(.252) 
.450* 
(.259) 
-.0226 
(.0299) 
-.0255 
(.0303) 
-.0313 
(.0289) 
-.0348 
(.0291) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.0372 
(.138) 
.0383 
(.163) 
-.0592 
(.150) 
-.0957 
(.139) 
-.0139 
(.0206) 
-.0105 
(.0194) 
-.0191 
(.0154) 
-.0180 
(.0154) 
Political rights index .373 
(.393) 
.272 
(.432) 
-.0879 
(.529) 
-.504 
(.731) 
-.0954 
(.0912) 
-.141* 
(.0816) 
-.0899 
(.0695) 
.0020 
(.0860) 
Civil liberty index .356 
(.512) 
.288 
(.540) 
-.0003 
(.621) 
.336 
(.638) 
.121 
(.161) 
.239 
(.157) 
.230 
(.143) 
.193 
(.145) 
No. of observations 221 208 193 178 691 650 607 565 
Adjusted R2  .723 .697 .699 .685 .800 .816 .823 .826 
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Appendix Table A5., continued 
 
(3) Low-income Countries 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Log of Mean Real Monthly Earnings  
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours Actually Worked  
(hours) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-15.7*** 
(4.28) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
4.87 
(5.05) 
   -178.1*** 
(24.5) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -15.8*** 
(4.43) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 3.18 
(5.06) 
   -146.8*** 
(13.8) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  -16.3*** 
(4.06) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.71 
(5.06) 
   -159.6*** 
(44.2) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   -14.4*** 
(3.59) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-.813 
(3.64) 
   22.8 
(32.7) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 1.44 
(2.86) 
   -6.11 
(20.3) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  .145 
(3.99) 
   48.1 
(68.6) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   4.19 
(3.96) 
   10.7 
(80.8) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
7.97 
(9.04) 
   -17.9 
(52.9) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 4.26 
(10.3) 
   38.3 
(78.1) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  1.33 
(9.63) 
   24.6 
(94.5) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   .966 
(7.82) 
   399.8 
(280.1) 
ln(GDP per capita) -.879 
(23.9) 
-6.38 
(23.6) 
-11.5 
(27.9) 
-3.27 
(27.1) 
24.8 
(151.5) 
-129.4 
(237.1) 
-462.2 
(705.4) 
745.1** 
(252.9) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 -.702 
(1.64) 
-.341 
(1.61) 
-.0603 
(1.83) 
-.620 
(1.72) 
-2.03 
(10.2) 
7.80 
(15.1) 
27.3 
(42.9) 
-50.5*** 
(12.4) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.322* 
(.174) 
-.319* 
(.180) 
-.319 
(.183) 
-.277 
(.162) 
-.282 
(.739) 
-.121 
(.647) 
-.598 
(1.17) 
-1.14 
(3.37) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-.127 
(.123) 
-.120 
(.129) 
-.0834 
(.136) 
-.0674 
(.107) 
.213 
(.558) 
-.305 
(.320) 
-.813 
(.558) 
-.739 
(6.49) 
Political rights index -.317 
(.403) 
-.207 
(.456) 
-.0581 
(.436) 
.172 
(.454) 
-.0293 
(1.78) 
-.771 
(1.38) 
.590 
(3.65) 
-6.41 
(21.9) 
Civil liberty index -.250 
(.639) 
.137 
(.621) 
-.0441 
(.764) 
.112 
(.841) 
2.51 
(3.67) 
5.70 
(6.63) 
10.4 
(10.2) 
.0118 
(6.79) 
No. of observations 97 92 86 79 46 43 41 36 
Adjusted R2  .905 .898 .897 .898 .992 .992 .992 .956 
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Appendix Table A5., continued 
 
(3) Low-income Countries, continued 
Dependent variable: 
Labor Condition Measures 
Fatal Occupational Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core Conventions Ratified  
(conventions) 
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4 
H
ig
h
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   -2.93* 
(1.65) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   -.275 
(1.64) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   -2.77 
(2.11) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   -.566 
(1.14) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -5.91 
(3.53) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   -.875 
(1.04) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   1.85 
(2.95) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   -14.5 
(14.9) 
M
id
d
le
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   5.21 
(6.23) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
-50.4 
(35.8) 
   2.11 
(2.30) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   7.42 
(9.75) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 -13.4 
(15.7) 
   2.88 
(2.25) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   28.5. 
(20.6) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  8.86 
(21.4) 
   2.79 
(1.98) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   -13.6 
(14.8) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   5.10 
(23.3) 
   1.62 
(1.52) 
L
o
w
-i
n
co
m
e 
R
T
A
 p
ar
tn
er
s 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-1 
N.A. 
(--) 
   35.8. 
(35.4) 
   
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-1 
77.5 
(71.1) 
   2.97 
(3.66) 
   
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 N.A. 
(--) 
   36.6. 
(35.8) 
  
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-2 
 37.4 
(37.8) 
   -1.59 
(4.64) 
  
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  N.A. 
(--) 
   34.0. 
(38.5) 
 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-3 
  59.4 
(62.8) 
   -4.99 
(4.89) 
 
RTA Concentration with 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   N.A. 
(--) 
   N.A. 
(--) 
RTA Concentration w/o 
Labor Clauses t-4 
   30.7 
(62.2) 
   -2.94 
(3.64) 
ln(GDP per capita) -250.0* 
(122.3) 
-183.7 
(108.7) 
-175.1 
(210.4) 
-138.2 
(305.2) 
10.0 
(7.22) 
15.2** 
(6.95) 
18.1** 
(6.95) 
7.77 
(7.51) 
ln(GDP per capita)2 17.1* 
(8.25) 
12.6 
(7.61) 
12.6 
(14.2) 
9.52 
(19.8) 
-.648 
(.476) 
-.977** 
(.472) 
-1.15** 
(.479) 
-.459 
(.520) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
.825 
(.919) 
.367 
(1.29) 
.783 
(1.40) 
.237 
(.620) 
-.0279 
(.0581) 
-.0258 
(.0541) 
-.0131 
(.0518) 
-.0384 
(.0369) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
-1.54* 
(.715) 
-.992 
(.557) 
-.818 
(.543) 
-1.28 
(.955) 
-.0483 
(.0817) 
-.0470 
(.0765) 
-.0519 
(.0706) 
-.0769 
(.0740) 
Political rights index -.519 
(1.80) 
.971 
(2.72) 
-.354 
(4.48) 
1.61 
(4.70) 
.198 
(.238) 
.333 
(.266) 
.442 
(.279) 
.516 
(.308) 
Civil liberty index 1.42 
(2.19) 
-.748 
(3.51) 
.521 
(6.46) 
1.22 
(5.15) 
-.390 
(.316) 
-.486 
(.348) 
-.505 
(.412) 
-.533 
(.450) 
No. of observations 54 48 43 37 188 179 170 158 
Adjusted R2  .998 .997 .997 .571 .705 .702 .694 .715  
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Appendix Table A7. Impacts of the First RTA with Labor Clauses on Labor Conditions 
 (RTAs with labor clauses defined by the liberal classification) 
 
 Dependent variable: Labor Condition Measure 
Log of Mean Real 
Monthly Earnings 
(earnings) 
Mean Weakly Hours 
Actually Worked 
(hours) 
Fatal Occupational 
Injury Rate 
(injury) 
No. of ILO Core 
Conventions Ratified 
(conventions) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-1 
(Dt-1) 
-.707 
(.649) 
3.37 
(3.55) 
-.457 
(1.15) 
.0047 
(.191) 
Dt-1 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.318 
(.996) 
-14.3 
(11.3) 
-.267 
(1.87) 
.104 
(.399) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-2 
(Dt-2) 
-.315 
(.693) 
.833 
(3.75) 
2.13 
(1.62) 
.231 
(.375) 
Dt-2 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
-.316 
(1.17) 
3.12 
(6.84) 
-1.75 
(1.58) 
-.119 
(.509) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-3 
(Dt-3) 
-.144 
(.419) 
-.814 
(4.17) 
1.07 
(1.94) 
.123 
(.427) 
Dt-3 * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
-.149 
(1.03) 
5.54 
(7.35) 
5.47 
(8.26) 
.0893 
(.587) 
1
st
 LC-RTA dummy t-4+ 
(Dt-4+) 
-.345 
(.558) 
-1.56 
(3.54) 
1.13 
(1.38) 
.170 
(.385) 
Dt-4+ * Initial EX Share 
of the RTA partner 
.422 
(.879) 
-16.0
*
 
(9.17) 
-1.63 
(1.65) 
.0439 
(.505) 
ln(GDP per capita) -12.5 
(9.73) 
90.3 
(58.2) 
-14.0 
(24.5) 
3.08 
(3.62) 
ln(GDP per capita)
2
 .937 
(.576) 
-5.45 
(3.74) 
.802 
(1.40) 
-.128 
(.213) 
Industry employment 
(% in total employment) 
-.130 
(.0795) 
.484 
(.483) 
.123 
(.185) 
-.0099 
(.0277) 
Manufacturing VA 
(% of GDP) 
.110
*
 
(.0620) 
-.746 
(.961) 
-.129 
(.141) 
-.0119 
(.0260) 
Political rights index -.198 
(.174) 
-.114 
(1.32) 
-.0058 
(.484) 
-.0298 
(.0105) 
Civil liberty index -.330 
(.341) 
.406 
(2.10) 
-.102 
(.607) 
-.152 
(.170) 
No. of observations 471 453 412 807 
Adjusted R
2
  .809 .887 .985 .857 
Notes: Fixed-effect regressions for countries. Time (year) dummies are also included.  
Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate the significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.    
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Appendix Table A8.  Information on RTAs with Labor Clauses (in force as of the end of the first half of 2013) 
RTA Members/Signatories Date into force Income Category RTA Members/Signatories Date into force Income Category
US-Austlaria USA 1-Jan-2005 High EFTA-Hong Kong* Iceland 1-Oct-2012 High
Australia 1-Jan-2005 High Liechtenstein 1-Oct-2012 High
US-Bahrain USA 1-Aug-2005 High Norway 1-Nov-2012 High
Bahrain 1-Aug-2005 High Switzerland 1-Oct-2012 High
US-Chile USA 1-Jan-2004 High Hong Kong 1-Oct-2012 High
Chile 1-Jan-2004 Middle (upper) EFTA-Montenegro* Iceland 1-Oct-2012 High
US-Colombia USA 15-May-2012 High Liechtenstein 1-Sep-2012 High
Colombia 15-May-2012 Middle (lower) Norway 1-Nov-2012 High
US-Jordan USA 17-Dec-2001 High Switzerland 1-Sep-2012 High
Jordan 17-Dec-2001 Middle (lower) Montenegro 1-Sep-2012 (N.A. )
Korea-US USA 15-Mar-2012 High CARICOM (rev)* Antigua & Barbuda 5-Jul-2001 Middle (upper)
Korea (S) 15-Mar-2012 High Bahamas 5-Jul-2001 High
US-Morocco USA 1-Jan-2006 High Barbados 5-Jul-2001 Middle (upper)
Morocco 1-Jan-2006 Middle (lower) Belize 5-Jul-2001 Middle (lower)
US-Oman USA 1-Jan-2009 High Dominica 4-Jul-2003 Middle (lower)
Oman 1-Jan-2009 Middle (upper) Grenada 4-Jul-2002 Middle (lower)
US-Panama USA 31-Oct-2012 High Guyana 5-Jul-2001 Low
Panama 31-Oct-2012 Middle (lower) Haiti 4-Jul-2003 Low
US-Peru USA 1-Feb-2009 High Jamaica 5-Jul-2001 Middle (lower)
Peru 1-Feb-2009 Middle (lower) Montserrat 5-Jul-2001 (N.A. )
US-Singapore USA 1-Jan-2004 High St. Kitts & Nevis 5-Jul-2001 Middle (upper)
Singapore 1-Jan-2004 High St. Lucia 6-Aug-2002 Middle (upper)
NAFTA USA 1-Jan-1994 High
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
5-Jul-2001 Middle (lower)
Canada 1-Jan-1994 High Suriname 5-Jul-2001 Middle (lower)
Mexico 1-Jan-1994 Middle (upper) Trinidad & Tobago 5-Jul-2001 Middle (upper)
CAFTA-DR USA 1-Mar-2006 High EU-CARIFORUM States* Austria 1-Nov-2008 High
Costa Rica 1-Jan-2009 Middle (lower) Belgium 1-Nov-2008 High
Dominican Rep. 1-Mar-2007 Middle (lower) Bulgaria 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
El Salvador 1-Mar-2006 Middle (lower) Croatia 1-Jul-2013 Middle (upper)
Guatemala 1-Jul-2006 Middle (lower) Cyprus 1-Nov-2008 High
Honduras 1-Apr-2006 Low Czech Republic 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Nicaragua 1-Apr-2006 Low Denmark 1-Nov-2008 High
Canada-Chile Canada 5-Jul-1997 High Estonia 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Chile 5-Jul-1997 Middle (upper) Finland 1-Nov-2008 High
Canada-Colombia Canada 15-Aug-2011 High France 1-Nov-2008 High
Colombia 15-Aug-2011 Middle (lower) Germany 1-Nov-2008 High
Canada-Costa Rica Canada 1-Nov-2002 High Greece 1-Nov-2008 High
Costa Rica 1-Nov-2002 Middle (lower) Hungary 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Canada-Peru Canada 1-Aug-2009 High Ireland 1-Nov-2008 High
Peru 1-Aug-2009 Middle (lower) Italy 1-Nov-2008 High
Canada-Jordan Canada 1-Oct-2012 High Latvia 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Jordan 1-Oct-2012 Middle (lower) Lithuania 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Turkey-Chile Turkey 1-Mar-2011 Middle (lower) Luxembourg 1-Nov-2008 High
Chile 1-Mar-2011 Middle (upper) Malta 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
TPSEP (P4) Brunei Darussalam 12-Jul-2006 High Netherlands 1-Nov-2008 High
Chile 8-Nov-2006 Middle (upper) Poland 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
New Zealand 28-May-2006 High Portugal 1-Nov-2008 High
Singapore 28-May-2006 High Romania 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
EEA Austria 1-Jan-1995 High Slovakia 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Belgium 1-Jan-1994 High Slovenia 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Bulgaria 1-Jan-2007 Middle (lower) Spain 1-Nov-2008 High
Croatia 1-Jul-2013 Middle (upper) Sweden 1-Nov-2008 High
Cyprus 1-May-2004 High UK 1-Nov-2008 High
Czech Republic 1-May-2004 Middle (upper) Antigua & Barbuda 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Denmark 1-Jan-1994 High Bahamas 1-Nov-2008 High
Estonia 1-May-2004 Middle (lower) Barbados 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Finland 1-Jan-1995 High Belize 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
France 1-Jan-1994 High Dominica 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Germany 1-Jan-1994 High Dominican Rep. 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Greece 1-Jan-1994 High Grenada 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Hungary 1-May-2004 Middle (upper) Guyana 1-Nov-2008 Low
Ireland 1-Jan-1994 High Jamaica 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Italy 1-Jan-1994 High St. Kitts & Nevis 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Latvia 1-May-2004 Middle (lower) St. Lucia 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Lithuania 1-May-2004 Middle (lower)
St. Vincent & the
Grenadines
1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Luxembourg 1-Jan-1994 High Suriname 1-Nov-2008 Middle (lower)
Malta 1-May-2004 Middle (upper) Trinidad & Tobago 1-Nov-2008 Middle (upper)
Netherlands 1-Jan-1994 High Chile-China* Chile 1-Oct-2006 Middle (upper)
Poland 1-May-2004 Middle (lower) China 1-Oct-2006 Low
Portugal 1-Jan-1994 High Chile-Colombia* Chile 8-May-2009 Middle (upper)
Romania 1-Jan-2007 Middle (lower) Colombia 8-May-2009 Middle (lower)
Slovakia 1-May-2004 Middle (lower) New Zealand-China* New Zealand 1-Oct-2008 High
Slovenia 1-May-2004 Middle (upper) China 1-Oct-2008 Low
Spain 1-Jan-1994 High New Zealand-Malaysia* New Zealand 1-Aug-2010 High
Sweden 1-Jan-1995 High Malaysia 1-Aug-2010 Middle (upper)
UK 1-Jan-1994 High Nicaragua-Taiwan* Nicaragua 1-Jan-2008 Low
Iceland 1-Jan-1994 High Taiwan 1-Jan-2008 High
Liechtenstein 1-Jan-1994 High 
Norway 1-Jan-1994 High
EU-Korea Austria 1-Jul-2011 High
Belgium 1-Jul-2011 High
Bulgaria 1-Jul-2011 Middle (lower)
Croatia 1-Jul-2013 Middle (upper)
Cyprus 1-Jul-2011 High
Czech Republic 1-Jul-2011 Middle (upper)
Denmark 1-Jul-2011 High
Estonia 1-Jul-2011 High
Finland 1-Jul-2011 High
France 1-Jul-2011 High
Germany 1-Jul-2011 High
Greece 1-Jul-2011 High
Hungary 1-Jul-2011 Middle (uuper)
Ireland 1-Jul-2011 High
Italy 1-Jul-2011 High
Latvia 1-Jul-2011 Middle (lower)
Lithuania 1-Jul-2011 Middle (lower)
Luxembourg 1-Jul-2011 High
Malta 1-Jul-2011 High
Netherlands 1-Jul-2011 High
Poland 1-Jul-2011 High
Portugal 1-Jul-2011 High
Romania 1-Jul-2011 Middle (lower)
Slovakia 1-Jul-2011 High
Slovenia 1-Jul-2011 High
Spain 1-Jul-2011 High
Sweden 1-Jul-2011 High
UK 1-Jul-2011 High
Korea (S) 1-Jul-2011 High   
Note: The income categories of countries are classified 
by the World Bank based on GNI/cap in 1995. 
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Appendix Table A9. Classification of RTAs in terms of Contents & Stringency of 
Labor or Labor-related Provisions 
 (revised from Table 1 in Kamata (2014)) 
 
 
Group 1: RTAs demanding domestic labor laws to be consistent with the ILO guidelines or 
equivalent set of internationally recognized standards; stipulating the procedures for 
cooperation, consultations, and/or dispute settlement on labor issues (8 RTAs): 
  USA-Colombia; USA-Korea (South); USA-Panama; 
  Canada-Chile; Canada-Colombia; Canada-Jordan; Canada-Peru; 
  NAFTA 
 
Group 2: RTAs urging members to harmonize domestic labor laws following the ILO guidelines 
or equivalent set of internationally recognized standards; stipulating the procedures for 
cooperation, consultations, and/or dispute settlement on labor issues (14 RTAs): 
USA-Australia; USA-Bahrain; USA-Chile; USA-Jordan; USA-Morocco; 
USA-Oman; USA-Peru; USA-Singapore;  
USA-CAFTA-Dominican Republic (CAFTA-DR); 
Canada-Costa Rica; Chile-Turkey;  
European Economic Area (EEA); EU-Korea (South) 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPSEP or P4)
*
; 
 
Group 2.5: RTAs stating that each member has the right to determine and regulate its domestic labor 
standards without requiring harmonizing them with each other; stipulating the procedures 
for cooperation, consultations, and/or dispute settlement on labor issues (9 RTAs): 
  EFTA-Hong Kong; EFTA-Montenegro;  EU-CARIFORUM States;  
New Zealand-Malaysia; New Zealand-China;  
Chile-China; Chile-Colombia; Nicaragua-Taiwan; 
Carribean Community and Common Market (CARICOM);  
 
Group 3: RTAs affirming members’ commitment to the ILO standards or equivalent set of 
internationally recognized standards, without requiring to have domestic labor laws to 
the ILO guidelines (9 RTAs): 
  European Free Trade Association (EFTA); EFTA-Albania; EFTA-Canada; 
EFTA-Colombia; EFTA-Peru; EFTA-Serbia; EFTA-Ukraine; 
  EU-Chile; Japan-Philippines; 
 
Group 4: RTAs mentioning labor rights but not in the context of the ILO standards; mentioning 
to aim to improve working conditions (3 RTA): 
  EFTA-Chile; EFTA-Mexico; EFTA-SACU (Southern African Customs Union) 
 
 
 
*  The agreement among Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, which is now being 
negotiated for the expanded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with other 8 countries.  
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Appendix Table A9, continued:  
 
 
Group 5: RTAs mentioning social matters including human rights, but not labor issues 
exclusively  (51 RTAs): 
  Andean Community; Australia-New Zealand; Brunei-Japan;  
China-Hong Kong; Colombia-Mexico;  
Colombia-El Salvador & Guatemala & Honduras; 
  Common Economic Zone (CEZ);  
Common Market for Eastern & Southern Africa (COMESA);  
Eastern African Community (EAC);  
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS);  
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC);  
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA);  
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG);  
Southern African Development Community (SADC);  
  MERCOSUR; MERCOSUR-India;  
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU);  
Hong Kong-New Zealand; India-Japan; India-Singapore;  
Japan-Indonesia; Japan-Malaysia; Japan-Singapore; Japan-Thailand;  
Japan-Viet Nam; Pakistan-Malaysia; Peru-South Korea;  
Singapore-Australia; Thailand-New Zealand; Turkey-Jordan;  
Turkey-Palestine; 
EFTA-Egypt; EFTA-Macedonia; EFTA-Jordan; 
EFTA- Korea (South); EFTA-Lebanon; EFTA-Morocco;  
EFTA-Palestinian Authority; EFTA-Singapore; EFTA-Tunisia;  
EU-Albania; EU-Côte d’Ivoire; EU-Egypt; EU-Israel; EU-Jordan; EU-Lebanon; 
EU-Montenegro; EU-Morocco; EU-PNG/Fiji; EU-Serbia; EU-Tunisia 
 
Group 6: RTAs not mentioning any labor or social matters (129 RTAs) 
  (all other RTAs in force and notified to the WTO as of July 2013; list omitted) 
 
 
Note: This table shows a revised version of the RTA classification presented by Kamata (2014), Table 1. 
 
  
